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The increasing use of virtual worlds for education, entertainment and business, 
together with the rising popularity of online games have led to a greater familiarity with the 
use of avatars. Research has demonstrated that avatars can affect users' virtual experience. In 
particular, self-similar avatars are important to examine as prior research has shown that 
people tend to create avatars that are similar to themselves. However, it is not known if 
avatars can influence crucial aspects of behaviour and attitude, such as deception, self-
disclosure and intention to continue use of a medium. These are pertinent in virtual 
environments as greater honesty and self-disclosure improve the quality of the online 
experience while continuance intention fosters customer loyalty and helps maintain a 
substantial user base. 
This study investigated separately the effect of avatars on deception, self-disclosure 
and continuance intention. Specifically, it examined the influence of self-similar avatars that 
people are so apt to create, through mediators like self-awareness, self-presence, 
identifiability and immersion. In doing so, it contributed to theory-testing, with suggestions 
for theory-building, expanded the theorisation of the concept of avatar-self similarity and 
unveiled mechanisms that underlie the relationships.  
Three research models of deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention were 
proposed and empirically tested using structural equation modelling. Data was obtained from 
a web-based survey of 209 users of Second Life, a virtual world that allows people to 
socialise, as well as create and trade virtual property.  
Results revealed that avatar-self similarity had varying effects on deception and self-
disclosure depending on the mediators. In the deception model, avatar-self similarity led to 
greater self-awareness and self-presence, which increased deception. It also brought about 
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identifiability, which reduced deception. As well, avatar-self similarity heightened self-
awareness and increased self-presence, which encouraged self-disclosure. However, while 
perceptions of identifiability were stronger with avatar-self similarity, it resulted in less self-
disclosure. In the continuance intention model, avatar-self similarity heightened self-
awareness and increased immersion, which intensified the intention to continue use of the 
medium. 
The exploration of underlying mechanisms by which avatars affect behaviours and 
attitude brought about a better understanding of the intricate interplay of effects. While the 
empirical findings validated the models, the study also made some valuable theoretical 
contributions. It showed that in virtual environments, self-presence may be an important 
construct to consider in self-awareness theory, pushed the theorisation of avatar-self 
similarity and revealed important mediating relationships. It also surfaced the impact of the 
mediators and their roles in the relationship between avatars and deception, self-disclosure 
and continuance intention. The models proposed can be applied to other avatar-driven virtual 
environments and serve as a framework for further investigation of these behaviours and 
attitude. 
The findings have some implications for the improvement of virtual environments and 
user experience through the mediators identified. While some are practical applications, 
others are suggestions for practitioners to reduce undesirable behaviours, like deception. 
Finally, the limitations of the study are discussed and suggestions made for future research. 
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Several years ago a young girl joined the group I was in 
and a few days later admitted that "she" was an underage 
boy from the Teen Grid. He wouldn't leave when I asked 
him to, so I let the group leaders know and they ejected 
him. Two days later, another young girl joined the 
group, with a similar name and mannerisms. When I 
challenged her, the group leaders made her say 
something on voice, and she spoke a few words. A few 
days later, she and I were talking and "she" admitted 
being the same underage boy, using a disguised voice. 
This time the group leaders wouldn't eject him. He may 
be a fine upstanding resident these days, but I would 
never trust him again, because he lied to get what he 
wanted. 
 
~ GreenLantern Excelsior (2013) 
 
The above anecdote echoes a behaviour prevalent in daily situations and online 
encounters. People lie for a variety of reasons which could either be self- or other-oriented. In 
online environments, lies may be more difficult to identify due to the lack of auditory and 
behavioural cues which are generally relied on. In the anecdote, the underaged boy outted 
himself but had he not done so, none would have been any wiser. The use of an avatar 
complicates deception detection as people tend to take the avatar at face value (Dumitrica & 
Gaden, 2009; Martey & Consalvo, 2011), are unable to make demeanour judgements (Ekman 
& O'Sullivan, 1991) and get distracted by the avatar (Galanxhi & Nah, 2007). However, what 
is worse than the duplicity itself is the loss of trust. The relationship of GreenLantern 
Excelsior and the underaged boy cannot progress beyond a superficial acquaintanceship 
because he would not be able to trust the boy with any self-disclosing information that can 
lead to stronger bonds or a personal relationship.  
Encompassing some of the issues highlighted, the aim of this study is to examine the 
effect of avatars on deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. Specifically, the 
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study focuses on self-similar avatars as people tend to create avatars that are like themselves 
(Messinger et al., 2008), and investigates the underlying mechanisms through which they 
affect deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. With the prevalent use of avatars 
in an ever-expanding range of activities, like education and training, online business and e-
health, this is an area that is both crucial and timely to explore. 
The avatar is an important digital representation through which the user lives and 
relates to others in the virtual world. It embodies the identity of the user, which is conveyed 
through the choices made during the creation and customisation of the avatar. These choices 
have repercussions on user interaction with others and affect others' perception of the user. 
Avatars can increase satisfaction with the retailer in online shopping (Holzwarth, 
Janiszewski, & Neumann, 2006), affect behaviour of their real-life users (Yee, Bailenson, & 
Ducheneaut, 2009), and elicit self-disclosure (Bailenson, Yee, Merget, & Schroeder, 2006) 
Initially used in instant messaging and forums, avatars have become indispensable elements 
in Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) and virtual worlds. They 
are influential because they are the users' means to navigate the virtual environment and 
through them, users express themselves and form relationships with others.  
Extant literature on self-similar avatars have examined their impact on attitudes, 
perceptions, behaviour and psychology. For instance, it was found that people who created 
self-similar avatars experienced greater identification (Trepte & Reinecke, 2010), more 
intense game enjoyment (Downs & Sundar, 2011), heightened self-awareness (Vasalou, 
Joinson, & Pitt, 2007), and in violent games, greater aggression (Eastin, 2006; Williams, 
2011). They also experienced greater private self-awareness (Vasalou, et al., 2007), which is 
the cognisance of the personal aspects of the self. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, none of 




Deception, where information is manipulated to create a false belief in the receiver, is 
a significant area to explore as it brings severe ramifications: It can undermine relationships 
and cause interpersonal and economic damage. The grave consequences warrant a deeper 
understanding of when and why people deceive. Even though there is great interest in offline 
and online deception, research on avatar-driven deception is comparatively limited. The few 
extant studies either examined the relationship from the perspective of user intention to 
deceive (Galanxhi & Nah, 2007) or tend to be descriptive in nature (e.g., Boellstorff, 2008).  
Relatedly, self-disclosure is examined as it is conceptually linked to deception. Self-
disclosure entails a certain degree of honesty since to self-disclose is to reveal previously 
unknown personal information about the self to others. Self-disclosure also serves as a 
primary means through which people build and maintain relationships; it can bond people 
and move relationships forward. However, it is premised upon trust, which is easily destroyed 
by deception. Although some research has shown that there is greater disclosure online due to 
the reduced concerns about others' disapproval or sanctions (McKenna & Bargh, 1999), it 
remains unclear how self-similar avatars can influence the user's proclivity to self-disclose. 
Continuance intention, or the intention to continue using a medium, can help maintain 
thriving virtual worlds and MMORPGs, and reap profits for game developers. Yet, research 
has neglected to consider if avatars affect this aspect of user attitude even though it can 
potentially be useful for customer retention. Thus, continuance intention is examined as one 
of the outcomes in this study as well as it could conceivably be an effect brought on by self-
awareness and immersion — two of the factors that could mediate the relationship between 
avatar and behaviour.  
To better understand how avatars can affect user behaviours/attitude of deception, 
self-disclosure and continuance intention, intervening variables that help explain the 
relationships will be explored. Drawing from self-awareness theory, self-awareness, or 
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attention focused on the private and covert aspects of the self, can increase an individual's 
cognisance of his or her internal standards, resulting in greater adherence to these standards. 
Honesty, being a standard common to all, should become salient when individuals are self-
aware, leading to reduced deception (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 
1999; Froming, Walker, & Lopyan, 1982). As self-aware individuals are more introspective 
and reflective, they may have more self-information to share, which can increase self-
disclosure (Davis & Franzoi, 1986; Franzoi, Davis, & Young, 1985). Other consequences of 
self-awareness include greater accuracy in the assessment of internal states and heightened 
awareness of bodily experiences (Buss, 2001). As such, self-aware individuals might be more 
sensitive to the effect of stimuli of the virtual environment, which may predispose them to 
experience self-presence, where the virtual self is perceived as the real self, and immersion, 
where one feels surrounded by the virtual environment. Thus, the theoretical notions of self-
presence and immersion are incorporated in this research as well. The concept of self-
awareness is central to this study as it connects avatar similarity to the outcomes of deception, 
self-disclosure and continuance intention either directly or through its effects on self-presence 
and immersion. Finally, identifiability (i.e., the state where one's identity is known to others) 
is included as it is a concept that has been extensively studied in computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) and it would be useful to understand users' perceptions of 
identifiability when using an avatar and how these affect behaviour. 
In short, the study seeks to find out how self-similar avatars can affect deception, self-
disclosure and continuance intention through the intervening variables of self-awareness, 
self-presence, immersion and identifiability. 
To achieve this objective, the study proposes three models with avatar similarity as 
antecedent and separate outcomes of deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. In 
both the deception and self-disclosure models, self-awareness, self-presence and 
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identifiability are intervening factors while in the continuance intention model, self-
awareness and immersion are advanced as the intervening variables. Generally, avatar 
similarity should heighten self-awareness. While self-awareness is expected to reduce 
deception and encourage self-disclosure, it is also postulated to increase self-presence and 
immersion. Self-presence should discourage deception and augment self-disclosure while 
immersion should strengthen continuance intention. Identifiability, on the other hand, is 
anticipated to decrease both deception and self-disclosure. The hypotheses and the models 
will be described in detail in the chapter on hypothesis development. 
Prior studies have examined some of the direct causal relationships (e.g., the effect of 
self-awareness on deception or self-disclosure) but relationships demonstrated in offline 
settings may not always carry into online settings, particularly for virtual environments, 
which are peculiar in having a digital representation that fosters a sense of presence. This 
study, therefore, hopes to extend previous knowledge by testing some of the established 
findings as a chain of effects rather than as discrete individual relationships in an avatar-
driven environment, and to add novel factors like self-presence, which has not been studied in 
the context of deception and self-disclosure. Previous research has also not sufficiently 
theorised the notion of avatar similarity, which this study will further push.  
A test of the research models should advance our understanding of the complex and 
multi-faceted relationship avatar construction has with behaviour and attitude. In specifying 
the conditions under which avatar similarity would have different valenced effects on 
deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention, the study can surface the different 
influences and processes, outlining the mechanisms through which avatar affects these 
behaviours and attitude. It is envisaged that the models may be applicable to other avatar-
driven environments and can potentially be extended by other researchers to further our 
understanding of related human behaviours and attitudes. 
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In the next chapter, the scholarship relevant to the factors investigated will be 
reviewed and the theoretical underpinnings of the models explained. The following chapter 
draws heavily on self-awareness theory to explain the underlying rationale and many of the 
resulting hypotheses. These are presented, together with an illustration of the three 
prospective models.  
The next chapter justifies the methodology employed and describes the sampling 
strategy, collection of data, as well as the instruments used. Demographic information of the 
sample and the benchmarks adopted for data analysis will be outlined as well.  
Using structural equation modelling (SEM), the research models will be examined in 
the following chapter for their fit to the data and the hypotheses will be tested. Secondary 
analyses are also conducted to test potentially interesting relationships. Next, the study 
discusses the results and significant theoretical contributions of the findings. Finally, the 
practical applications of the findings for practitioners are examined and an assessment of the 







The virtual self 
An avatar is a graphical representation of the user and can be in 2-D or 3-D form. 
While instant messengers and chats generally use 2-D avatars, virtual worlds and MMORPGs 
typically employ 3-D ones. Avatars are important in virtual environments as users navigate 
the virtual environment and interact with others through them. They can take on myriad 
representations, from humans to animals to objects, limited only by one's imagination. 
Different avatars though are judged differently. Users perceive more anthropomorphic and 
less androgynous avatars as more attractive and credible, with masculine avatars seen as less 
attractive than feminine ones (Nowak & Rauh, 2005, 2008). 
 
Customising the avatar 
People often look to the characteristics of the avatar to infer perceptions about the 
person behind it (Nowak & Rauh, 2008) since the construction of one's avatar is a measured 
process. Almost every aspect of an avatar reflects the owner's near-total intentionality, as 
little is left to chance (Boellstorff, 2008). The avatar is a conscious choice in presentation 
determined by the owner. Generally, people tend to make their avatars similar to themselves 
(Messinger, et al., 2008),  for instance, people prefer anthropomorphic avatars (Nowak & 
Rauh, 2005) that are of their own sex as this increases identification (Nowak & Rauh, 2005; 
Trepte, Reinecke, & Behr, 2009). However, the avatars tend to be more attractive (Messinger, 
et al., 2008), younger, thinner and more fashionable (Ducheneaut, Wen, Yee, & Wadley, 
2009), or have more favourable attributes (Bessière, Seay, & Kiesler, 2007). Avatar features 
are also chosen with the game's demands in mind to facilitate mastery (Trepte, et al., 2009). 
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Thus, while people tend to choose self-similar avatars in non-competitive games, they prefer 
non-similar ones in competitive games (Trepte & Reinecke, 2010). Established offline 
findings on social behaviour, such as gender roles, interpersonal distance and eye gaze, seem 
to transfer to online environments. Hence, while men were more likely to create objects and 
work on their virtual property, women were more likely to shop and meet people. They also 
changed their avatar's appearance more often than men (Guadagno, Muscanell, Okdie, Burk, 
& Ward, 2011). As in real life, male dyads kept larger interpersonal distances in-world and 
maintained less eye contact than female dyads (Yee, Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang, & Merget, 
2007). People also admitted to being more outgoing, extroverted, less thoughtful/more 
superficial and engage in more risk-taking when using their avatars (Messinger, et al., 2008). 
While often users may create more than one avatar, they are able to identify the main one 
(i.e., the one they use the most) and the alts (or alternates; Ducheneaut, et al., 2009). 
The plasticity of the avatar provides the means for people to present themselves in 
different forms and behaviours. A number of factors have been found to influence this 
calculated choice. Contextual demands can affect the choice of avatars (Trepte, et al., 2009), 
for instance, avatars in dating may be made to look attractive while those in gaming may look 
more intellectual (Vasalou & Joinson, 2009). As well, individual life satisfaction impacts 
avatar creation, with those satisfied with their lives creating avatars similar to themselves in 
personality while dissatisfied users created dissimilar avatars (Trepte & Reinecke, 2010). 
Users with lower psychological well-being have a greater tendency to create avatars that are 
more similar to their ideal self and with more favourable attributes (Bessière, et al., 2007). 
Personality factors and self-esteem were found to have some effect on avatar creation (Dunn 
& Guadagno, 2012). Introverts, compared to extroverts, were more likely to construct 
attractive avatars in order to reach out and encourage more social interaction. Similarly, 
women high in neuroticism were more inclined to create attractive avatars to present 
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themselves in the best light. Those who were more open to new experiences were more likely 
to view their avatar as having fewer discrepancies from themselves as they tend to be 
consumed by their role-play and see their avatar as a true extension of themselves. Those 
with low self-esteem, trying to compensate for pale skin, were more likely than those with 
high self-esteem to select darker skin tones relative to their lighter skin tones (Dunn & 
Guadagno, 2012).  
 
Avatar effects 
As the virtual body represents the self when interacting with others, the social 
presence of other virtual beings provokes a reaction from the user as well. Just as computers 
tend to be anthropomorphised as they display signs of intelligence (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 
1994), agents (or computer-controlled representations) and static avatars (e.g., bots) may be 
treated the same way as human-controlled avatars (Nowak, 2004), particularly when static 
avatars are perceived to possess properties of anthropomorphism and credibility (Nowak, 
Hamilton, & Hammond, 2009).  
However, in cases requiring high-level responses compared to low level responses, 
knowing that a representation is an avatar rather than an agent will result in greater social 
influence. High-level responses are those that necessitate conscious control and greater 
cognitive demands (e.g., meaningful conversation) while low-level responses refer to 
processes that are somewhat automatic and require less conscious control, such as reflexes 
(Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2003). In terms of proxemics, people react to 
avatars and agents differently. Approaching agents were avoided more than avatars, 
presumably because there was some cognisance that the avatar would stop and not walk 
through them while the agent, being controlled by a computer, may have no notion of 
personal space. Avatars were also given more personal space than agents even if they did not 
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behave realistically. Agents, on the other hand, had to have realistic gaze behaviour to 
influence interpersonal distance behaviour (Bailenson, et al., 2003).  
As gaze behaviour increases the fidelity of virtual beings to actual humans, they play 
an important part in influencing social judgement. For example, an avatar that appears to 
maintain mutual gaze all the time was judged to be more persuasive than an avatar with 
reduced or natural gaze (Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2005). However, 
even gaze has to be compatible with the overall appearance of the avatar. An improved gaze 
model, for instance, improved quality of communication only when paired with a higher 
realism avatar, the effect was absent when it was paired with a lower realism avatar (Garau et 
al., 2003). Apparently, more realistic avatars can set up higher expectations, which when 
unmet, would result in low attributions (Nowak, 2004).  
Having a choice of avatars can make a difference as well. Being able to choose an 
avatar increases the sense of self-relevance (Lim & Reeves, 2009). Therefore, compared to 
using an assigned avatar, the option to use an avatar of choice rather than an assigned one 
results in a more positive experience and greater arousal (Lim & Reeves, 2009), and is linked 
to greater motivation and depth of learning (Cordova & Lepper, 1996). Further, compared to 
those who were assigned avatars, people who created self-similar avatars expressed greater 
willingness to spend time in real-life to maintain good health, because they made mental 
images of their bodies in the avatar creation process, which in turn, influenced perception 
towards their physical bodies (Kim & Sundar, 2012).  
Researchers have found that even fictional, online characters perceived to be similar 
to the self were liked more (Konijn & Hoorn, 2005). Hence, it is probably natural that users 
would have stronger positive attitudes towards avatars that resemble them (Suh, Kim, & Suh, 
2011). This favourable perception can increase the avatar's perceived usefulness in realistic, 
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task-focused virtual contexts, which, in turn, intensifies the intention to use the avatar (Suh, et 
al., 2011).  
Since people tend to create avatars that are similar to themselves, recent research has 
examined the effects of such avatars. Avatars that resemble the user were found to have 
perceptual, attitudinal and behavioural influence on the user. For instance, self-similar avatars 
have been found to increase feelings of identification and to intensify game enjoyment 
(Trepte & Reinecke, 2010). The relation between similarity of avatar and game enjoyment 
was independent of the outcome of the game (Downs & Sundar, 2011). That avatar creation 
is linked to enjoyment is especially important in entertainment where keeping people engaged 
with the game could mean higher revenues for game companies as people are more likely to 
spend to acquire better items, to obtain a more powerful avatar, or to dress up and accessorise 
their avatars.  
On the other hand, people using self-similar avatars were found to be more strongly 
influenced when exposed to violence due to homophily and identification with the avatar. For 
example, in a violent game, people who made use of physically similar avatars were found to 
be more hostile (Williams, 2011). Having a same gender avatar also led to more aggressive 
thoughts (Eastin, 2006).  
A self-similar avatar may have psychological effects on the user. As a self-similar 
avatar can help an individual become immersed in the virtual environment, it has been found 
to lead to stronger feelings of self-presence (Ratan, Santa Cruz, & Vorderer, 2008) as well as 
heightened self-awareness (Vasalou, et al., 2007), though it has not been found to increase 
presence (Ratan, et al., 2008). A dissimilar avatar, on the other hand, could distance the user 
from the avatar, making transgressions committed by the avatar less disconcerting (Galanxhi 
& Nah, 2007). 
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Even with extant studies of avatar effects on users, research in this area is still limited. 
Many user behaviours and attitudes and how they may be affected by a self-similar avatar 
have not been investigated. This study, therefore, attempts to extend current understanding in 
the exploration of avatar effects on deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. 
 
Deception 
Deception in everyday life 
There are a number of ways to define deception. Buller and Burgoon (1996) refer to 
messages and information that are knowingly transmitted to bring about a false conclusion. 
Their definition encompasses instances when the information conveyed is controlled so as to 
give a meaning that differs from the truth. Hancock (2007) has a similar definition of digital 
deception. He explains it as “the intentional control of information in a technologically 
mediated message to create a false belief in the receiver of the message” (p. 290). Just as liars 
may tell the truth, honest people may lie; the fact that it is not their intention to do so makes 
the difference (Ekman, 2001). Incorporating intention into the definition means that if people 
contradict or disagree with one another, it may not necessarily be that one is lying but could 
stem from a different recall of events (Vrij, 2008). When deception is viewed from the point 
of view of the deceiver and not from the factuality of the statement (Vrij, 2008), “a statement 
is a lie if the deceiver believes that what he or she says is untrue, regardless of whether the 
statement is in fact true or false.” (p. 14).  
There are many ways to deceive, such as lies, fabrications, evasions, concealments, 
misdirection, bluffs, fakery, mimicry, tall tales, white lies, deflections, equivocation, 
exaggerations, camouflage and strategic ambiguity (Burgoon & Nunamaker, 2004). In the 
context of this study, deception shall focus mainly on lying.  
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Deception is a common occurrence in everyday life. It is so prevalent that small lies 
(e.g. lying about a friend’s awful new outfit) are hardly even noticed as lies. Kashy and 
DePaulo (1996) argued that lying is a part of social life instead of an unusual event. Using a 
daily diary methodology, participants were asked to keep records of their social interactions, 
and the lies they told during these interactions (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Kashy, Wyer, & Epstein, 
1996). It was found that people lied almost daily, with most lies being self-benefitting. 
Generally, people lied most frequently about their feelings, preferences, opinions and 
attitudes. They also lied about their achievements and failures. Less often told were lies about 
actions, whereabouts and plans (DePaulo et al., 2003). The lies were mainly told to 
accomplish basic social interaction goals, such as influencing others, managing impressions 
and providing reassurance and support (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). Thus, although people do 
tell lies for material gain, personal convenience or to escape punishment, more commonly, 
lies were told for psychological rewards. People told lies to appear better than they really 
were, to protect themselves and others from disapproval or disagreements, and from having 
their feelings hurt (DePaulo, et al., 2003). Such lies told on an everyday basis were perceived 
to be minor transgressions with little planning involved and not much worry about being 
caught (DePaulo, et al., 1996). Serious lies were told to hide transgressions, such as cheating 
on tests or betrayal of intimacy or trust (DePaulo, et al., 2003).  
Research on deceptive communication has mainly been on two tracks — the 
identification of verbal and non-verbal clues to deception, and deception detection accuracy 
of humans. Popular belief has it that deceivers can betray their act through non-verbal cues 
such as shifty bodies, fidgeting, gaze aversion, higher-pitched voice, hesitations and errors 
while speaking, covering of the mouth with hand, lower speech rates, increased eye blinks, 
and verbal cues such as unstructured narration, unusual details in accounts, spontaneous 
corrections and admission of lack of memory. Of these, empirical research has shown only 
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higher-pitched voice, hesitations and errors while speaking, lower speech rates and increased 
eye blinks to be associated with deception (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001; Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Other cues include more grammatical errors, repetitions, slips 
of the tongue, more negative and irrelevant statements, overgeneralisation and dissociative 
manner (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). Incorrect beliefs about the cues of deception and 
observation of the wrong cues contribute to the generally low levels of deception detection. 
Even when the correct cues were observed, there were also individual differences; people 
may be more expressive, socially anxious, or introverted (Vrij, 2007).  
Typically, the accuracy rate for lie detection is slightly above chance, with Bond and 
DePaulo (2006) putting 54% as a reasonable estimate. With the exception of secret service 
agents who make use of different information in their judgement, even professionals, such as 
police officers and judges, were not found to be any better at deception detection than lay 
people (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Vrij & Mann, 2001). The rather poor 
ability in deception detection is due to communicators giving each other the benefit of the 
doubt since, more often than not, they are faced with truthful rather than deceptive messages 
(DePaulo, et al., 1985; Vrij, 2007). In communication, there is the assumption that people 
want to be cooperative and would therefore want their messages to be honest and clear 
(Grice, 1975). This leads to the truth bias, where people assume that others’ communication 
with them would be truthful and trustworthy (Carlson, George, Burgoon, Adkins, & White, 
2004). Social conversational norms also deter people from displaying suspicion as 
communication partners would get irritated by repeated questionings (Vrij, 2007). As people 
are generally not certain if their communication partners are actually telling the truth, they 





Personality, motivational, and situational factors that affect deception 
Studies have examined the role of personal traits in the likelihood of lying even 
though there has been little empirical evidence for stable individual differences in dishonest 
behaviour across situations (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Studies on personality have generally 
produced limited and inconsistent results. In a study of personality factors of acting (people's 
natural ability to role-play), anxiousness, impression management, manipulativeness and 
sociability, none of these constructs were found to affect self-reported frequency of lying 
(Gozna, Vrij, & Bull, 2001). However, in terms of other perceptual and attitudinal 
judgements, individuals who scored high on acting felt that they were good liars, were less 
concerned about getting caught for their lies, perceived lying to be easy and rather effortless, 
and their lies to be undetectable, suggesting that they were comfortable about lying. 
Manipulative people perceived little guilt when lying (Gozna, et al., 2001) and were found to 
lie more frequently (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). Anxious and sociable people, on the other 
hand, felt guilty about lying and perceived that they manipulate people when they lie (Gozna, 
et al., 2001). These findings suggest that personality traits may be related to the acceptability 
of lying (McLeod & Genereux, 2008). Other studies related to impression management found 
that people told more lies to appear likeable or competent, with an average of 1.75 lies told 
every 10 minutes (Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002). This corroborates Kashy and DePaulo's 
(1996) findings that concern with self-presentation was related to frequency of lying, as were 
degree of socialisation and quality of interpersonal relationships. However, frequency of 
lying was not related to social self-confidence, self-esteem or social anxiety (Kashy & 
DePaulo, 1996). 
In research conducted with prison inmates, psychoticism and neuroticism were 
correlated with deception scores (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2004). Other studies suggest 
that personality characteristics that predict lying depends on the type of lie (McLeod & 
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Genereux, 2008). For example, honesty (negative correlations) and assertiveness predicted 
altruistic lies whereas approval motivation predicted lies to achieve social acceptance. While 
honesty and assertiveness, kindness, approval motivation and Machiavellianism were 
significant predictors of conflict avoidance lies, both honesty and assertiveness negatively 
predicted such lies while approval motivation was a positive predictor. Lies of self-gain were 
predicted by honesty and kindness (negative correlations), and self-monitoring and 
Machiavellianism (positive correlations; McLeod & Genereux, 2008). However, in a study on 
lying in job interviews, self-monitoring did not correlate with the number of lies told while 
extroversion did (Weiss & Feldman, 2006). Extroverts are sociable and would therefore place 
more emphasis on being accepted by others. One way of doing so would be to create a 
positive image of themselves, possibly through deception (Weiss & Feldman, 2006). 
Extroverts also have more experience with social interactions and have more practice at 
telling lies, making them skilled and their lies more persuasive. Their success at lying might 
result in more frequent lies (Weiss & Feldman, 2006).  
Social motive may be another predictor of deception as it drives the kind of 
information that people attend to and process (Steinel, Utz, & Koning, 2010). Pro-self 
individuals value independence, disregard other's ideas and try to outperform them. Pro-
social individuals value group harmony, work to reach consensus and to make a high-quality 
group decision. In an information pooling exercise, for example, pro-self individuals were 
more likely to withhold important information and lie about information they have in order to 
mislead others (Steinel, et al., 2010).  
Attachment security is an expectation-based sense that key people will be available 
and responsive in times of need (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005a). Recent findings suggest that it 
may foster honesty. To resist temptations to behave dishonestly requires personal strength, 
psychological stability and awareness of one's own mental processes. A source of such 
17 
 
personal strength and self-perception lies in having had experiences of supportive 
relationships (Adams, 2006; Gillath, Sesko, Shaver, & Chun, 2010; Shaver, Lavy, Saron, & 
Mikulincer, 2007). Attachment security, whether dispositional or induced, reduces anxiety 
and defensiveness, and increases openness and prosocial behaviour, thereby contributing to 
an individual's authenticity and honesty (Gillath, et al., 2010).  
Secure people are more likely to volunteer (Gillath et al., 2005), have higher trust in 
their partners (Mikulincer, 1998), and show compassion and altruism (Mikulincer, Shaver, 
Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005). Research has shown that people primed with security-related 
stimuli (e.g., words, like love, hug and affection, or memories of past experience of being 
supported by close others) experienced temporary lower attachment anxiety and avoidance, 
increased sense of attachment security (Gillath, Hart, Noftle, & Stockdale, 2009) and greater 
honesty (Gillath, et al., 2010).  
Conversely, unhappy experiences in important relationships can heighten attachment-
related insecurities (i.e., anxiety about abandonment and rejection, avoidance of closeness 
and dependency; Gillath, et al., 2010). This can engender defences, which hinder authentic 
self-understanding or distort communications with others, and as such, reduce honesty 
(Gillath, et al., 2010). Less secure people, for example, tended to lie more and believed that 
their partners lie more to them (Gillath, et al., 2010).  
Deception may also be affected by situational factors. The higher the incentive for 
deception, the more likely people will misrepresent information (Tenbrunsel, 1998), just as 
people would tend towards ethical behaviour when they know they will be rewarded for it 
(Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). This indicates a link between reinforcement systems and 
behaviour. Deception was more prevalent in the presence of low cognitive trust (which is 
focused on the competence, skills and abilities of the other; Olekalns & Smith, 2009) and in 
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situations when an individualistic motive, with high concern for own outcomes and little 
concern for others' outcomes, was adopted (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997). 
An environment that breeds concern that the other party will behave exploitatively is 
likely to trigger deception (Olekalns & Smith, 2009). When people have such concerns, they 
would not put all the information on the table as they might be taken advantage of. Instead, 
deception may be a means to protect one's own interest. 
In negotiation, deception is driven by greed, competition, experienced injustice and 
uncertainty (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994; Murnighan, 1991). To achieve 
better outcomes, people may be motivated towards unethical behaviour. This self-interest 
may take precedence over fair-play, cooperation and altruism (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 
2000). For instance, in a bargaining exercise, competitive negotiators were more likely to be 
deceptive than cooperative ones (Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2006). Similarly, self-
rated competitive individuals were more willing to use inappropriate negotiation tactics (e.g., 
misrepresentation and false promises) than self-rated cooperative individuals (Donahue, 
Lewicki, & Robert, 2000).  
On the other hand, deception may be attenuated when there is high affective trust 
(which focuses on the benevolence and integrity of the other; Olekalns & Smith, 2009), when 
both parties want the same outcome resulting in a mutually benefitting situation (O'Connor & 
Carnevale, 1997), and when ethical standards are made salient (Aquino, 1998). There is less 
deception in face-to-face (FtF) interactions than written communication because people are 
able to establish a basis for trust through getting to know one another and discussing topics 
unrelated to the negotiation task, thereby setting a positive tone for the negotiation. In 
comparison, these are more difficult to execute in written communication (Valley, Moag, & 




Affect in deception 
Affect refers broadly to feelings, emotional states or moods. Emotion is intrinsic to a 
rational, ethical decision process and should not be ignored as an irrational bias. Rather, 
paying heed to it can lead to better ethical decisions (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001). Positive 
emotions (e.g., happiness and gratitude) increase trust, while negative emotions (e.g., anger) 
decrease trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Positive emotions have been shown to have 
benefits for negotiation. For example, people with positive moods were more likely to plan to 
make deals, be more cooperative and less competitive than sad people (Forgas, 1998). They 
made more concessions in negotiations (Baron, 1990), reduced the use of contentious tactics 
and increased joint benefit (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). This suggests that positive emotions 
might reduce deception.  
Negative emotions, on the other hand, signal harm and reduce concern about 
maintaining relationships. As such, they are likely to decrease moral awareness (Olekalns & 
Smith, 2009). Negative emotions have been linked to deception (Knapp, Hart, & Dennis, 
1974; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). Envy, for instance, increases the 
likelihood of deception (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008) as does anxiety (Olekalns & Smith, 
2009). Anger makes people less willing to work with each other in future. The targetted 
experiences unfairness, anger and resentment, and may retaliate (Allred, 1999), for example, 
through the use of deception (Olekalns & Smith, 2009). 
 
Deception in Computer-Mediated Environments  
Even with verbal and non-verbal cues, people’s ability to detect deception in everyday 
life is dismal. Hence, it is reasonable to presume that the odds against deception detection are 
even greater in computer-mediated environments where these cues are virtually eliminated in 
predominantly text-based interactions. Online, not being co-located allows people to deceive 
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even more as information otherwise available is obscured. This allows a greater scope for 
deception, e.g., appearance, gender and location, and creates the general impression that it is 
relatively easy for deception to occur in CMC.  
The design features of communication technology, for instance, recordability and co-
presence, may affect lying (Hancock, Thom-Santelli, & Ritchie, 2004). According to 
Hancock and colleagues, the extent to which the messages exchanged are documented should 
hinder deception since messages are recorded and reviewable, essentially putting one's lies on 
record. When participants share a physical space, deception is limited as it constrains topics 
contradicting the physical setting. Conversely, online settings allow a greater scope for 
deception, e.g., appearance, gender and location (Hancock, et al., 2004). 
In addition, the ease of switching identities or manipulating multiple identities gives 
rise to the notion that deception is rife in online communication and that people can easily get 
away with it. Further, the increasing use of avatars, or users' digital representations, which 
can take on a variety of forms may distract and aid in deception (Galanxhi & Nah, 2007), 
making CMC seem unreliable and untrustworthy.  
There is the belief that people deceive more online due to the loosening of social 
constraints in computer-mediated environments that seems to foster disinhibition (Suler, 
2004). The lack of social presence decreases self-consciousness and can result in anti-social 
behaviour. Being geographically distributed and anonymous, individuals have greater liberty 
to engage in selective self-presentation to appear better, smarter and more attractive. Other 
research though found that people do not really change their level of deception (Caspi & 
Gorsky, 2006). For instance, Hancock et al (2004) found that people lie as much over instant 
messaging as FtF. Perhaps in line with the thinking that the virtual need not be taken 
seriously, many people experience a sense of enjoyment, not guilt, engaging in deceptive 
behaviour (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006).  
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As a result of the anonymity online, people are deindividuated and dehumanised, 
making it easier to lie and flame others. Deception can damage trust and lead to feelings of 
humiliation and anger in the deceived. This can negatively impact the development of 
relationships as people engage in superficial exchanges, not venturing to share anything 
personal or intimate about themselves. On the other hand, anonymity filters out gating 
features, such as speech disfluencies, social anxiety or shyness (McKenna, Green, & Gleason, 
2002), making it easier for individuals to develop relationships online through genuine self-
disclosure. People find it easier to express their real selves (i.e., the genuine self that is 
frequently protected; Blasi & Milton, 1991), which may be radically different from how they 
present themselves offline (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002). Thus, deception may also 
be attenuated online. 
Due to the nature of computer-mediated environments, which largely do not require 
the co-location of communicators, deception in the form of misrepresentation (Cornwell & 
Lundgren, 2001; Ellison, Heino, & Gibbs, 2006; Hancock, 2007; Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 
2008; Vrij & Holland, 1998), presentation of an ideal or true self (McKenna, 2007; 
McKenna, et al., 2002; Turkle, 1995; Whitty, 2008) or category deception (e.g., gender-
swapping; Boellstorff, 2008; Bruckman, 1996; Hussain & Griffiths, 2008; Turkle, 1994) 
seems particularly prominent. There are other forms of deception, for example, online fraud, 
scams and misrepresentation of identity, which may involve the loss of money and private 
information.  
A number of reasons, such as malicious intention, privacy concerns, play, idealised 
self-presentation and even psychiatric illness could be motivations for online deception 
(Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Joinson & Dietz-Uhler, 2002; Utz, 2005).  
Newer contexts of virtual worlds and MMORPGs, which make use of avatars could 
affect communication differently as the embodied digital self lends social presence and is a 
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channel through which non-verbal cues may be transmitted. Research on avatars and their 
effect on deception is, however, scarce. To the best of my knowledge, Galanxhi & Nah's 
(2007) study is the only one that has dealt directly with avatar and deception. Their research 
examined how users manipulate their avatars depending on the intended veracity of their 
communication. When there is an intention to deceive, users made their avatars different 
from themselves, and in doing so, experienced lower levels of anxiety when deceiving 
(Galanxhi & Nah, 2007). Still, it is necessary to extend the findings to determine if 
conversely, avatars could have an effect on user behaviour since deception is often 
spontaneous, such that people do not decide to use a virtual environment with the intention to 
deceive. This means that instead of the user deciding on the appearance of the avatar based 
on (deceptive) intention, in virtual environments, the process of avatar creation would 
naturally precede the deceptive communication. Thus, knowing if the avatar created 
according to the user's preference may influence user behaviour is important. 
 
Theoretical approaches in deception 
There are a limited number of theories that deal with deception. Theories, like the 
deceptive miscommunication theory, are established in the context of communication. The 
deceptive miscommunication theory sets out to connect communication and 
miscommunication processes in a global perspective. It subscribes to the view that deception 
is a kind of miscommunication and a chance in terms of communication since it increases the 
degrees of freedom available for the speaker (Anolli, Balconi, & Ciceri, 2002). Deceptive 
miscommunication, according to the theory, is not an alternative to truthful communication, 
neither is it a violation of or an exception to a standard of communication. Situated in a 
heterogeneous communication field with different kinds of deception and deceptive 
messages, deceptive miscommunication is driven by different levels of intention, and follows 
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the same mechanisms and planning processes as the default communicative messages 
(Anolli, et al., 2002). The same cognitive mechanisms are at work for planning, production 
and execution of both deceptive and truthful messages. The different layers of intention in 
deceptive miscommunication theory as explicated by Anolli et al refer to covert intention 
(i.e., the hidden intention of the deceiver to manipulate information to deceive) and overt 
intention (i.e., the intention to convey the manipulated information to the addressee). Overt 
intention consists of informative intention (the intention to convey the manipulated 
information to the addressee as if it were true) and "sincerity" intention (the intention to 
convince the addressee that the manipulated information is true). There is a second-order 
intentional layer, which is the distinction between genuine deception and a joke. In the 
former, the intention is for the addressee to believe that the information is true while the 
intention in the latter is for the addressee to know the information is false (Anolli, et al., 
2002).  
Among extant deception theories, the interpersonal deception theory has generated 
much scholarly attention. The interpersonal deception theory considers deceptive exchanges 
from a dyadic and dialogic perspective. It includes broad areas of interpersonal 
communication, non-verbal behaviour, message processing, credibility and deception (Buller 
& Burgoon, 1996). It is grounded on a large set of propositions which examines a range of 
variables, such as suspicion, behavioural leakage, relational intimacy and valence (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996). As interaction is dynamic, multi-functional and multi-modal, behaviours 
change over time as people become more familiar with each other, topics change and people 
adjust to one another's feedback (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). When the relationship is 
positively valenced, compared to strangers, familiar others show a greater truth bias (Buller, 
Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994). Thus, the 
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familiarity between interlocutors, as well as the valence of the relationship, affect deceptive 
behaviours.  
In order to achieve their aim at deception, deceivers employ strategies at various 
stages of the interaction. The deceiver would attempt to strategically manipulate information 
and maintain a truthful demeanour while monitoring for suspicion. The deceiver's familiarity 
with the receiver would affect detection apprehension, strategic behaviour and image 
management as well as leakage. As non-verbal behaviour is more difficult to control, it is 
possible to leak cues of deception (e.g., nervousness, negative affect and reduced 
conversational involvement), especially when the stakes are high. In this way, deceivers may 
inadvertently betray the authenticity of their message. When suspicion is detected (i.e., when 
the receiver expresses disbelief, asks for more information or deviates from expected 
behaviour), the deceiver may compensate by increasing eye gaze in an attempt to appear 
more involved (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Despite claims from Buller and Burgoon that the theory represents a fusion of 
interpersonal communication and deception principles which can better account for deception 
in interactive contexts, critics (e.g., DePaulo, Ansfield, & Bell, 1996; Stiff, 1996) have 
commented that what Buller and Burgoon have put together does not constitute a theory. 
They argued that the theory lacked a central explanatory mechanism (DePaulo, et al., 1996; 
Stiff, 1996), is unable to account for existing data, and some of the propositions are not 
falsifiable (DePaulo, et al., 1996). The interpersonal deception theory also lacks a causal 
mechanism to connect the propositions (Stiff, 1996). That many of the propositions focus on 
situational or contextual aspects of deceptive communication rather than on interactants' 
knowledge and predictions of each other make it more a "model of interactive deception than 
a model of interpersonal deception" (Stiff, 1996, p. 291). This greatly limits its explanatory 
powers. Stiff also pointed out that the interpersonal deception theory offers little unique 
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contribution since other theories, like language expectancy theory (Burgoon, Jones, & 
Stewart, 1975) and non-verbal expectancy theory (Burgoon & Hale, 1988), provide the 
foundation for many of the propositions. He asserts that existing theories of persuasion, for 
instance, information integration theory (Anderson, 1981), the heuristic model of persuasion 
(Chaiken, 1987) and language expectancy theory (Burgoon, et al., 1975), have sufficient 
breadth to provide a theoretical framework for understanding deceptive interactions across 
interpersonal and non-interpersonal contexts (Stiff, 1996). This might account for the small 
number of theories that specifically address deception. Nevertheless, the interpersonal 
deception theory is still lauded for its contributions in the descriptions of perceptions and 
displays of deceptive behaviours, credibility assessments and judgements of deception (Stiff, 
1996). 
Borrowed from psychology, social comparison theory is a theory that has been used in 
deception research. According to the theory, people obtain information on their performances 
by comparing themselves with others (Festinger, 1954). Through such comparisons with 
standards and other people, they know their own capabilities and limitations. However, under 
certain circumstances, such comparisons may be painful and threatening to the self 
(Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000).  
The self-evaluation maintenance model (Tesser, 1988; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988; 
Tesser & Paulhus, 1983) makes predictions when social comparison is threatening to the self. 
When a relevant or psychologically close other, compared to a distant other, outperforms the 
self on a task in a domain important to the self, the threat is perceived to be greater. For 
example, job applicants who encountered a socially desirable candidate vying for the same 
job experienced a drop in self-esteem (Morse & Gergen, 1970). Under such circumstances, 
when social comparison is perceived as threatening, individuals would be more willing to lie 
for impression management reasons (Argo, White, & Dahl, 2006). When comparison 
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discrepancy is small, people are more willing to lie to the relevant other compared to a 
stranger. However, when the discrepancy is large, there is willingness to lie regardless of the 
relevance of the comparison target, indicating that threatening self-evaluations have 
implications for people's willingness to engage in deceptive behaviours (Argo, et al., 2006). 
Compared to downward comparisons, people are more willing to lie in upward comparisons 
with relevant others. Social comparisons threaten both the private and public selves and 
increase the likelihood of lying as they can damage one's self-image and self-worth. 
Willingness to lie is greater when the comparison is social, rather than objective, in nature. 
However, willingness to lie was attenuated when others' superior performance is attainable 
rather than unattainable (Argo, et al., 2006).  
Grover's (1993a) role theory identified intrapersonal conflict in organisations that may 
serve as antecedents to lying. Role conflicts may pressure people into succumbing to lies as 
an escape. For instance, when there is conflict between a person's values and the 
organisation's expectations or when there is conflict between a person's assigned tasks and the 
available time, resources or capabilities, the person may be pressured to lie to appear to be 
keeping with the organisation's culture or to cope with the distress of performance pressure 
(Grover, 1993a). To cite an example from Grover, a parent with an unmonitored job could 
report having arrived at work punctually when in fact the parent was late due to a child-
related mishap.  
The competing demands of multiple roles that one takes on in an organisation or 
conflicting expectations of (super-ordinate) others might make lying an easier option to 
placate the parties involved. As well, Grover pointed out situational factors that might lead to 
deception in organisations. These include the lack of monitoring and perceptions that choice, 
avoidance or compromise do not work or are not available options. Some individual factors 
identified to affect propensity to lie are locus of control, moral development and role 
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commitment. People who have an external locus of control feel they have little power over 
authority figures or structural demands and are therefore more likely to lie when under such 
pressure (Grover, 1993a). Principled individuals are more likely to resist external influences 
and rely more on their ethical principles than on situational cues to guide their behaviour 
(Grover, 1993b). Commitment to a role also leads to more truth-telling. For example, highly-
committed nurses were less likely than less professionally committed nurses to lie to their 
fellow nurses (Grover, 1993b).  
 
Self-disclosure 
Self-disclosure is the act of revealing personal information to others so that it 
becomes shared knowledge. It can refer to the spoken word or to written texts. The disclosed 
needs to be personal information concerning the self, and it should be disclosed voluntarily. 
The information has to be authentic and not readily available from other sources (Rosenfeld, 
1979). Though it can be information that one shares freely with others or that one usually 
keeps hidden, it should be new information. However, not all self-disclosure are equal 
(Joinson & Paine, 2007). Revealing one’s hobbies and interests, for instance, is not the same 
as disclosing a personal fear. 
It is not possible to initiate, maintain or develop a relationship without self-disclosure. 
In fact, relationships are terminated when self-disclosure ceases (Tardy & Dindia, 2006). 
Initial disclosure in a relationship helps people to get to know each other and to reduce 
uncertainty (Tardy & Dindia, 2006). In the development of a relationship, it is used to restrict 
as well as intensify the relationship. The type of information disclosed also changes as the 
relationship progresses, from factual or objective to emotional and subjective (Tardy & 
Dindia, 2006).  
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Since self-disclosure is often reciprocal, it serves to strengthen bonds between people 
(Jourard, 1971a). When one self-discloses to another, the interacting partner feels obliged to 
reciprocate. This obligation to reciprocate applies even when individuals are met with 
"deviant" disclosers, for whom they express a dislike (Derlega, Harris, & Chaikin, 1973). 
Reciprocity is also greater for superficial, non-intimate matters as such disclosures are 
accessible to a wider audience (Altman, 1973; Cozby, 1972). The information that is 
disclosed can form relationships characterised by trust, intimacy and liking for each other. 
Within groups, it can strengthen the bonds of trust within the group, legitimise group 
membership and reinforce group identity (Joinson & Paine, 2007). Joinson (2001a), however, 
noted that the level of intimacy of the information revealed by each partner may not be equal.  
Self-disclosure involves risk since it makes the discloser vulnerable, and may even 
bring about a loss of individuality (Hinde, 1997). Disclosure of secrets may open the 
discloser to ridicule, exploitation, rejection, or even hurt (Derlega, Mett, Petronio, & 
Margulis, 1993; Hinde, 1997). In fact, extreme openness is cautioned as it raises the 
probability for more conflict (Hinde, 1997).  
Self-disclosure serves a number of functions which can affect perceptions of its 
appropriateness (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979). It might be for the expression of self where one 
makes known one's emotions or thoughts. It might be for self-clarification, where one's 
viewpoint or position is made clear to others. As individuals need others to affirm that their 
beliefs and views are in line with social norms, self-disclosure can serve this purpose of self-
validation. The reciprocal nature of self-disclosure means that with selective revelation of 
self-relevant information, self-disclosure can be used as a means to obtain control over their 
own and others' outcomes (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979).  
 
Benefits of self-disclosure 
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Even though self-disclosure involves revealing self-relevant information which can 
make one feel vulnerable, it has some rewards. It increases trust in a relationship since the 
discloser allowed himself or herself to be unguarded and defenceless, opened the self to 
negative feedback, and exposed individual weaknesses (Wheeless & Grotz, 1976).  
Individuals who self-disclose intimately are liked more by recipients of the self-
disclosure (Collins & Miller, 1994). Self-disclosure may be considered a social exchange, 
where the rewards and costs are weighed before a decision to engage or disengage from the 
social transaction is made. Trust is critical to the process as it can mitigate costs to the 
transaction (Metzger, 2004). Self-disclosure indicates liking and a desire for an intimate 
relationship, and is a rewarding outcome for the recipient of the disclosure (Collins & Miller, 
1994). It follows that people would be attracted to those who present them with rewarding 
outcomes. As well, information processing models (e.g., Ajzen's (1977) perceived attributes 
of interpersonal attraction model) suggest that attraction is influenced by beliefs about the 
person, with positive beliefs associated with greater attraction. Thus, self-disclosure that 
affects beliefs positively increases attraction (Dalto, Ajzen, & Kaplan, 1979).  
Self-disclosure offers benefits to physical and mental health. People who have 
experienced traumatic events and are willing and able to talk about it to others make fewer 
doctor visits (Pennebaker, Barger, & Tiebout, 1989), are less depressed (Raphael, 1977), 
ruminate less about the trauma and have lower probability of contracting stress-related 
diseases (Pennebaker & O'Heeron, 1984). Disclosers experience better overall health because 
the disclosure enables them to work through the trauma in a non-threatening context. It 
promotes mental health by decreasing self-alienation, increasing self-concept and allowing 
the individual to obtain greater consistency between self-concept and others' concept of him 
or her (Rosenfeld, 1979). The disclosure may also satisfy the ego or obtain cathartic relief for 
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the discloser (Worthy, Gary, & Kahn, 1969). Low disclosure, on the other hand, is indicative 
of a repressive self and inability to grow as a person (Jourard, 1959).  
 
Factors affecting self-disclosure 
Some researchers (e.g., Benner, 1968; West, 1971) have noted that self-disclosure is a 
complex interpersonal construct. At a minimum, it is a function of the demographic 
characteristics of the discloser, the target of the disclosure, the social situation, the topic of 
disclosure and the relationship between discloser and the target. Self-disclosure is also 
associated with personality of the discloser.  
In terms of demographics, females generally disclose more than males (Cozby, 1973; 
Jourard, 1971b) possibly due to socialisation where boys are expected to hide their feelings 
while girls are allowed to show their emotions (Derlega & Chaikin, 1976). Ethnicity can 
influence self-disclosure. Studies have found that some ethnic minorities, like Blacks, Puerto 
Ricans and Mexican Americans, disclose less than Anglo-Americans (LeVine & Franco, 
1981; Sattler, 1970). East Asians are more guarded in their self-disclosure as well (Barry, 
2003). The differences cut across nationalities. Taiwanese Chinese and Germans, for 
example, were less self-disclosing than Americans, who were more willing to reveal 
themselves to casual acquaintances or strangers (Chen, 1995; Plog, 1965).  
Given that individuals decide what, how and to whom they are going to disclose while 
weighing the possible rewards against the possible risks of disclosing in a situation (Omarzu, 
2000), some factors may encourage self-disclosure. The interacting partner plays an 
important part in the amount of disclosure that can be elicited. The partner needs to be 
someone the speaker feels comfortable with and with whom the speaker has some established 
relationship. Intimate disclosure to a stranger or acquaintance, for instance, is seen as more 
maladjusted than non-disclosure while disclosure to someone either older or younger is seen 
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as less appropriate than non-disclosure (Chaikin & Derlega, 1974). Besides being self-
disclosing, if the partner is warm and evaluates the speaker favourably, the speaker is likely 
to disclose more than if the partner is cold and negative (Pope & Siegman, 1968; Taylor, 
Altman, & Sorrentino, 1969).  
Greater liking also encourages more self-disclosure. Individuals not only disclose 
more to those whom they like, they also like those to whom they have self-disclosed (Collins 
& Miller, 1994). If self-disclosure is a social exchange process, then more intimate self-
disclosure should have greater value (Worthy, et al., 1969). However, intimacy of disclosure 
has been found to be less powerful than valence of disclosure in affecting recipient's 
attraction (Gilbert & Horenstein, 1975). At high intimacy levels, the effect of reciprocity of 
disclosure is also reduced and the high disclosing individual is perceived as less adjusted than 
low or medium disclosers (Cozby, 1972). 
The nature of the relationship can also affect the amount and consequences of 
disclosure (Hinde, 1997). Individuals in short-term relationships with no commitment tend to 
disclose more openly. Hence, in encounters with strangers, where there is little worry about 
future vulnerability, disclosure may occur more freely, much like the "stranger on the train" 
phenomenon. Other research has found that strangers make use of the disclosure input to 
govern their own response (Derlega, Wilson, & Chaikin, 1976). There is a stronger obligation 
among strangers to reciprocate high intimacy input during an encounter than between friends 
as friends do not have to prove to the discloser that their trust was well-placed. Built on 
mutual trust, friendships may not need constant monitoring of each other's behaviour. Thus, 
disclosures may be intimate or non-intimate depending on its usefulness in meeting mutual 
needs (Derlega, et al., 1976). Other studies have shown reciprocity of intimate self-disclosure 
between dyads of strangers and spouses. However, descriptive disclosure between stranger 
dyads did not elicit reciprocity, possibly due to the interlocutors following conversational 
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scripts rather than actually responding to each other (Dindia, Fitzpatrick, & Kenny, 1997). As 
well, the level of relationship affects self-disclosure. More self-descriptive information was 
disclosed to opposite-sex strangers than to spouses for both men and women, but women 
disclosed more intimate thoughts and feelings to their husbands than to opposite sex 
strangers. This affirms the hypothesis that demographic and biographic information are given 
early in a relationship with more personal information (e.g., feelings) disclosed later in a 
developing relationship (Dindia, et al., 1997). 
Self-disclosure can be influenced by situational factors. These include the physical 
room environment, size of room and the number of people in it. For instance, people disclose 
more intimately in a warm, cosy room (pictures on the wall, soft cushioned furniture, rug and 
soft lighting) than in a cold, non-intimate room of bare cement, block walls and over-head 
fluorescent lighting (Chaikin, Derlega, & Miller, 1976). The cold, hard architectural design is 
believed to lead to alienation from one's environment, as well as other people (Sommer, 
1974), while a soft, warm room is similar to the environment in which people interact with 
friends (Chaikin, et al., 1976). Crowding leads to lower affiliative behaviour, with individuals 
reluctant to talk about intimate topics in a small room (Sundstrom, 1975).  
Physical and body contact between people resulted in increased self-disclosure 
(Cooper & Bowles, 1973) although other studies report reactions of avoidance, bewilderment, 
embarrassment and displays of discomfort with the invasion of private space (Felipe & 
Sommer, 1966; Garfinkel, 1964). Culture appears to influence the relation between physical 
contact and self-disclosure. Touching and self-disclosure were weakly correlated in a study 
conducted with American university students (Jourard & Rubin, 1968). In a similar study 
conducted with Israeli university students, there was a positive relationship between self-
disclosure and touching behaviour. Men were also found to engage in more touching 
behaviour while women self-disclosed more (Lomranz & Shapira, 1974). Generally, men and 
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women had the same degree of physical contact with their mothers and friends. Only with 
their fathers did women touch and were touched more than men. While in a heterosexual 
dyad, there is a significant tendency for women to touch those to whom they self-disclose 
more, there is only a slight tendency for men in same-sex dyads to have physical contact with 
those to whom they self-disclose (Jourard & Rubin, 1968). 
Intimacy of the topics discussed has an effect on self-disclosure. Men were less 
disclosing than women on intimate topics (e.g., personal deficiencies, personality problems 
and health concerns) while there was no sex differences in disclosure on non-intimate ones 
(e.g., favourite leisure reading material, sporting activities and favourite foods; Morgan, 
1976) nor on "masculine" topics, such as those that emphasise assertiveness and 
aggressiveness (Derlega, Durham, Gockel, & Sholis, 1981). 
Attachment style, too, has been consistently linked with self-disclosure. Secure 
persons have less need for consensus or self-enhancement (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005b), and 
have happy, friendly and trusting relations with intimate others (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). 
They expect others to be responsive in stressful situations (Hazan & Shaver, 1987), and to 
feel loved and be supported (Shaver & Hazan, 1988). These positive expectations and warm 
feelings might lead to the conviction that intimate relationships are rewarding and heighten 
desire to form such relationships (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). As self-disclosure is the 
basis for forming intimate relationships, this interaction goal would steer them towards self-
disclosure. Secure persons, for example, self-disclosed more to different targets of parents 
and friends compared to avoidant persons (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). They experienced 
greater satisfaction in their relationships because they disclosed more intimately than persons 





Self-disclosure in Computer-Mediated Environments 
Self-disclosure is central to trust development (Wheeless, 1976), relationship 
building, mental health, (Tardy & Dindia, 2006) and information exchange (Derlega, et al., 
1973) in both offline and online settings. Generally, people self-disclose more online than 
offline due to a variety of reasons like the illusion of privacy, immersion in the immediate 
task, inattention to audience (Weisband & Kiesler, 1996) and anonymity (Derlega & Chaikin, 
1977). Apparently, the filtering out of social cues and non-verbal information makes it easier 
to reveal embarrassing or unfavourable information.  
Just as there is little worry when people disclose to strangers, people more readily 
disclose about themselves online because they are unlikely to meet FtF those they encounter 
online, making the dyadic boundary even more secure. One of the characteristics of CMC is 
anonymity, which makes it more conducive to share intimate, personal information, since 
there is less fear of sanction or disapproval (McKenna & Bargh, 1999). It is believed that 
CMC offers some sheltering effects, which make people less self-conscious about others' 
perceptions and more comfortable disclosing about themselves (Tidwell & Walther, 2002). 
Gating features that discourage self-disclosure, such as visible shyness, social anxiety or lack 
of social skills (McKenna, et al., 2002), are removed in the anonymous environment. 
Individuals are freed from the expectations and constraints of those they know (Bargh, et al., 
2002) and taboo or negative aspects of the self can be divulged without severe repercussions 
(Derlega, et al., 1993). 
Disclosure in computer-mediated environments occurs relatively earlier in a potential 
online relationship compared to FtF communication, leading to a more rapid development of 
relationship, with greater intimacy and closeness. Limitations of the channel compel more 
intimate questions, and fewer peripheral disclosures from interacting partners than in FtF 
settings, where more superficial questions and disclosures take place (Tidwell & Walther, 
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2002). As well, those who anticipate future interaction with their CMC partners tend to 
disclose and ask more personal questions (Tidwell & Walther, 2002). Due to the accelerated 
pace at which self-disclosure occurs online, budding relationships can become intense quite 
quickly.  
Other research has found that surveys administered over the computer revealed a 
higher level of disclosure. In a computer-administered survey, college students reported 
higher levels of alcohol consumption and riskier sexual behaviour (Booth-Kewley, Larson, & 
Miyoshi, 2007). Similarly, in an online survey, adolescents gave less socially desirable 
responses on sensitive topics (Vereecken & Maes, 2006). It is believed that due to the sense 
of disinhibition that CMC fosters, respondents are more likely to be truthful in their 
disclosures. Social norms regarding a behaviour or attitude have less influence on 
respondents when there are no others around physically to pass judgement or whom the 
respondents feel they have to present themselves appropriately to. 
Situational conditions for self-disclosure might be a strong motivating factor in some 
cases. People rely more on situational cues of privacy rather than their pre-existing attitudes 
in their decisions to self-disclose to a website (Joinson, Reips, Buchanan, & Schofield, 2010). 
Cues of privacy (e.g., having a credible domain name, no spelling mistakes or dodgy 
advertisements) encourage disclosure when trust is low, and when the disclosure is sought 
from a trusted organisation, people are willing to forgo privacy concerns (Joinson, et al., 
2010). 
Yet there are arguments that due to reduced cues, interacting partners tend to 
overattribute and create an idealised picture of their partners, while they, having more time to 
plan their messages, can reflect and selectively self-present to convey a favourable 
impression of themselves (Walther, 1996). Selective self-disclosure can be used as a social 
strategy to withhold or reveal information to achieve specific goals (Quattrone & Jones, 
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1978) and has been found to be negatively correlated with the need for approval (Brundage, 
Derlega, & Cash, 1976; Burhenne & Mirels, 1970).  
The use of avatars in virtual environments can further influence self-disclosure. 
Previous studies have shown that less realistic avatars elicited more self-disclosure from users 
because they reduced feelings of co-presence (Bailenson, et al., 2006) while attractive avatars 
made their users feel friendly and extroverted, leading to more self-disclosure (Yee & 
Bailenson, 2007). While these are important areas to examine, it is equally crucial to 
understand what the effect of self-similar avatars would be on users' self-disclosure, 
especially since people tend to create such avatars. Yet, this remains a relatively unexplored 
area. This study, therefore, attempts to fill this gap through investigation of the relationship 
between self-resembling avatars and self-disclosure.  
 
Self-awareness 
Self-awareness stems from the tendency of an individual's attention to be directed 
either outwards to the external environment, such as the social situation, tasks and the people 
around or towards the self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). A distinction is made between 
subjective self-awareness, where consciousness is focused on events external to the 
individual's consciousness, personal history or body, and objective self-awareness, which is 
the reverse. When attention is directed inwards, the individual's consciousness is focused on 
himself and he becomes the object of his own consciousness — hence the term objective self-
awareness. In the same way, when attention is directed away from the self, the individual 
becomes the subject of the consciousness that is directed towards external objects, giving rise 
to the term subjective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Conscious attention cannot 
simultaneously be focused on the self and the environment though there may be rapid 
oscillation between the internal and external.  
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The notion of self is generally believed to consist of both the private and public 
aspects. The private self consists of the personal, covert aspects of the self that are usually 
hidden from others, such as personal beliefs, memories, inner feelings or thoughts. The public 
self is the socially apparent self and consists of overtly-expressed aspects of the self, 
including elements that are relevant to self-presentation, such as appearance, mannerisms and 
accent (Suls, 1993; Yao & Flanagin, 2006). However, either aspect would only influence 
overt behaviour if attention is focused on it. In this study, however, only private self-
awareness is investigated as it is believed to be heightened through the use of self-similar 
avatars. Public self-awareness, on the other hand, should not be affected by self-similar 
avatars but might be heightened through contact with other avatars. 
The concept of self-awareness hinges on the orientation of conscious attention. It is 
also understood to be self-focused attention or selective processing of information about the 
self. The disposition to be self-attentive is known as self-consciousness. A number of studies 
(e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981c; Scheier & Carver, 1977) have shown that findings associated 
with self-consciousness parallel those of research that manipulated self-awareness. For 
instance, private self-consciousness, as like private self-awareness, is associated with 
attribution to self (Duval & Wicklund, 1973). Similar to those made self-aware, when 
angered, individuals high in self-consciousness aggressed more than those not made self-
aware and those low in self-consciousness (Buss, 1961; Scheier, 1976). 
Generally, stimuli that direct attention towards the self have the effect of making 
public or private aspects of the self salient (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Davis & Brock, 1975; 
Geller & Shaver, 1976; Wicklund & Duval, 1971). The type of stimuli is key in the focus of 
self-attention. Specifically, a mirror causes individuals to be cognisant of their previously 
held beliefs and gives rise to behaviours that show an awareness of the covert, personal 
aspects of the self (Froming, et al., 1982; Scheier & Carver, 1980). A television camera, an 
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audience or a tape recording of one’s voice causes individuals to be conscious of the 
appropriateness of the way they conduct themselves and elicits behaviours that show an 
awareness of the overtly-displayed and social aspects of the self (Froming, et al., 1982; 
Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier & Carver, 1980). Thus made self-aware, people attend to the 
social aspects of themselves and are concerned with the impression that they convey to others 
through their behaviour (Webb, Marsh, Schneiderman, & Davis, 1989). 
One of the factors found to affect self-awareness is CMC. Research has shown that 
people using CMC experienced significantly greater private self-awareness and marginally 
lower public self-awareness than in FtF interaction (Matheson & Zanna, 1988, 1990). Though 
Matheson and Zanna did not specify any reason why CMC would heighten private self-
awareness, Joinson (2001b) suggested that it could be that CMC often takes place in a quiet 
environment where people would be more introspective or reflective. When people use 
emoticons in CMC, they are also made more aware of their affective state through the act of 
translating that affect into writing, which can increase self-awareness (Joinson, 2001b). 
Avatars can similarly affect levels of self-awareness. An avatar created to be similar to 




The theory of self-awareness was first proposed by Duval and Wicklund (1972), and 
was subsequently extended to include the notion of self-consciousness as a personality 
variable (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Self-awareness theory stems largely from the 
acknowledgement that attention directed inwards, towards the self, is fundamentally different 
from attention directed outwards, towards the environment. It, therefore, rests on the 
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assumption that internal-directed attention and external-directed attention would have unique 
psychological consequences. 
Attention directed externally results in conformity to normative pressures (Froming & 
Carver, 1981; Froming, et al., 1982) and individuals are sensitive to the reaction of others to 
them, prompting them to act in a manner that others would approve (Greenberg, 1983; 
Scheier, 1980). Such publicly self-aware individuals are concerned with the impression they 
make on others, especially in terms of appearance and dress (Bushman, 1993; Solomon & 
Schopler, 1982). For instance, women high on public self-consciousness tend to wear more 
makeup, believing that it enhances their appearance (Miller & Cox, 1982). Public self-
awareness involves taking an external perspective of the self and viewing oneself from the 
outside with the mind's eye (Fenigstein, 2009). However, as public self-awareness is not the 
focus of this study, it shall not be discussed further. 
On the other hand, attention to the private self results in behaviour that reflects 
personal attitudes (Froming, et al., 1982), affects self-evaluation (Scheier & Carver, 1983) 
and self-esteem (Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973). Private self-awareness focuses on internal 
states, memories and personal characteristics. Self-awareness theory assumes that when 
attention is focused onto the private self, it causes self-evaluation and a comparison of current 
behaviour with standards of correctness. A standard is a mental representation of correct 
behaviour, attitudes and traits. For instance, an individual's mental representation of ideal 
personality traits such as intelligence and adaptiveness, define what a "correct" person is 
when taken together (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). To the extent that the self does not match up 
to the mental representation, such a comparison will result in a perceived discrepancy and 
self-evaluation. Since the discrepancy is negative and therefore, aversive, it would motivate 
behaviour to avoid stimuli that cause self-awareness and impel efforts to create distraction. 
For example, male subjects who received a negative first-impression response from a female 
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confederate spent less time listening to a tape-recording of their own voice compared to those 
who received a positive first-impression response. The negative experience led to a decreased 
exposure to one's voice as it re-invoked attention towards the discrepancy (Gibbons & 
Wicklund, 1976). Distraction can reduce the amount of self-awareness and people asked to 
memorise two poems delivered them more accurately when they were free to move about 
(i.e., when non-self-aware) than when made to stand still with hands at their sides (Wicklund, 
1975).  
If escape from the self-aware-inducing stimuli is not possible, attempted discrepancy 
reduction between behaviour and standard will take place, i.e., the individual may try to 
modify his behaviour in order to conform more closely to the standard so as to reduce the 
aversiveness of self-awareness. Thus, the aversive drive state serves to motivate behaviour. 
Once the discrepancy is reduced, the aversiveness is minimised. Subsequent studies 
acknowledged that the discrepancy could result in positivity (i.e. when the self exceeds the 
standard; Wicklund, 1975). In such cases, the person will tend to seek out the circumstances 
that have made him self-aware. 
Contrary to Wicklund, Carver and Scheier (1981a) were not of the thinking that self-
focus is phenomenologically aversive. In a sentence completion blank under conditions of 
high or low self-focus, no evidence was found that self-focus was accompanied by negative 
self-affect (Carver & Scheier, 1978). Other researchers (e.g., Hull & Levy, 1979) found self-
awareness did not result in aversiveness and had no apparent effects on reported mood. 
Carver and Scheier argued that private self-consciousness was unrelated to social anxiety, test 
anxiety, activity level, impulsivity or emotionality (Carver & Glass, 1976) — variables that 
would be relevant to drive arousal (Carver & Scheier, 1978). Further, they contended that 
there is little to demonstrate that self-aware people will be drawn towards dimensions in 
which discrepancies exist between the current state and standard (Carver & Scheier, 1978). 
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Thus, instead of the aversive drive state as advanced by Duval and Wicklund, Carver and 
Scheier (1981a) proposed a discrepancy-reducing feedback loop, which works like a self-
regulatory system by moderating behaviour in reference to a standard of comparison. The 
system works by first comparing the existing state and the standard. If the comparison reveals 
a discrepancy, the existing state changes so as to reduce the discrepancy. If in a subsequent 
comparison the discrepancy still exists, change will again take place and will continue to 
recur as long as a discrepancy remains. Carver and Scheier extended the notion of standard, 
describing it as a "point of comparison" (p 120), with standards existing at different levels 
and with the possibility of conflict with each other. They argued that the internal focus of 
attention helps in accessing the self-schema, which allows for more efficient and accurate 
encoding and retrieval of self-relevant information. Also, it is the individual's assessment of 
the likelihood of attaining the goal or to reduce the discrepancy that affects the willingness to 
stay in a state of self-awareness as well as the amount of effort devoted to match the standard 
(Gibbons, 1990). Carver and Scheier, however, agree with Duval and Wicklund that when the 
discrepancy cannot be reduced, attention on the self is aversive. 
Some research from Bond (1982) seems to lend credence to the feedback loop system. 
In a learning task, people were either given a set of mainly simple items mixed with a few 
complex ones, or complex items mixed with a few simple ones. An audience was either 
present or absent. According to drive theory, an audience-induced drive should help in 
performance on simple items and should undermine performance on complex items (Carver 
& Scheier, 1981b). Bond, however, found that subjects working on complex items inferred 
after some time that they were doing poorly. This inference impaired performance even on 
the simple items that have been added to the complex ones. In the same way, those working 
on the predominantly easy items inferred that they were doing well, and this inference 
facilitated their performance even on the difficult items that have been inserted. This reflected 
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the feedback loop that Carver and Scheier proposed and at the same time, indicated that the 
drive mechanism Duval and Wicklund advanced was not tenable. According to them, self-
attentive people may interrupt their behaviour to assess the likelihood of being able to 
achieve the desired outcome (Carver, 1979; Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979). This is 
especially likely to occur when the situation is highly evaluative, resulting in the outcome 
being important or uncertain, or when there is evidence that the individual's performance so 
far has not been good. If the assessment is favourable, there is a return to the attempt to match 
the standard. If, however, the outcome is unfavourable, there may be attempts to withdraw, 
leading to reduced persistence, or mental withdrawal or disengagement if physical 
withdrawal is not possible (Carver & Scheier, 1981b). This, presumably, was the experience 
of Bond's subjects who were given the set of predominantly complex items. 
 
Consequences of self-awareness 
When people are more aware of the personal, covert aspects of their selves, it leads to 
a number of  outcomes. A consequence of self-awareness is the adherence to personal 
standards of behaviour (Carver, 1974).  When a standard is made salient, individuals conform 
to the standard under conditions of private self-awareness (Carver, 1974). According to self-
awareness theory, self-aware individuals are more likely to abide by normative standards as 
self-awareness increases cognisance of any deviations between the individual's behaviour and 
standard. To reduce the discrepancy between behaviour and standard, individuals are 
motivated to change the self to align with standards (Wicklund & Duval, 1971) or avoid the 
situation (Carver, et al., 1979; Duval, Duval, & Mulilis, 1992). 
A major emphasis of self-awareness theory has been on standard-related behaviour. A 
number of studies have demonstrated the impact of self-awareness on normative behaviour. 
For example, when given the opportunity to cheat on an anagrams test, significantly more 
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individuals cheated when non-self-aware than when self-aware (Diener & Wallbom, 1976) 
and there was less cheating in the assignment of a positive consequence task when self-aware 
than when not self-aware (Batson, et al., 1999). Generally, there is greater honesty when 
people are self-aware as honesty is a standard that is common to all. In cases when moral 
standard salience was low, however, accommodation of standard to behaviour occurred when 
self-awareness was high. For instance, individuals assigned themselves instead of others the 
positive consequences task with the majority maintaining that this was the most moral thing 
to do or that there was no morally correct way to assign the tasks. Only a small number said 
that some form of other-oriented action was most moral (Batson, et al., 1999). Personal 
standards do not refer only to moral standards but also to individual beliefs and attitudes. It 
has been found that self-awareness increases punishment intensity when individuals' attitudes 
favour punishment in learning and decreased punishment intensity when they opposed it even 
when this was inconsistent with their beliefs about societal expectations (Froming, et al., 
1982). For instance, non-angered self-aware persons aggressed less against women, 
punishing them with less intense electric shocks in a learning experiment compared to non-
self-aware individuals, as standards generally prohibit aggression towards women (Scheier, 
Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974). In short, previous research has shown that self-aware individuals 
will be more likely to examine and evaluate their behaviour in terms of their standards of 
correctness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Standards of correctness can be personal standards or 
standards expected in a given situation, e.g., speed and precision in a task. Since personal 
standards, such as honesty, are universal and immutable, there is a general tendency for 
individuals to adhere to these standards. Thus, self-awareness leads to greater honesty. 
Self-aware individuals also experienced clarification of knowledge as their attention is 
focused on that particular dimension of the self (Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979; 
Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977; Turner, 1980). Self-aware subjects, for 
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instance, became more accurate in assessing their own internal states, and were more resistant 
to suggestions about symptoms they were told they should experience (Gibbons, et al., 1979). 
Similarly, in a taste test, high self-conscious individuals were more aware of bodily 
experiences and rated the intensity of a test solution accurately despite being told to anticipate 
differently (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979). Compared to low private self-conscious 
individuals, those who were high in private self-consciousness could remember more self-
relevant trait terms in a reaction time task (Turner, 1980).  
Heightened emotional response is another consequence of self-awareness (Scheier & 
Carver, 1977; Scheier, 1976). Having been made self-aware, individuals who experienced 
positive mood inductions felt more elated while those who have undergone negative mood 
inductions felt more depressed (Scheier & Carver, 1977). Angered persons made self-aware 
aggressed more than those not made self-aware due to heightened awareness of their affective 
state (Scheier, 1976).  
 
Immersion 
The concept of immersion has been considered in many contexts, most commonly in 
virtual reality and games. Immersion is crucial to the enjoyment of games (Brown & Cairns, 
2004). When individuals are immersed in a game, they lose themselves in it, time is forgotten 
and they are oblivious to people and things around them (Jennett et al., 2008).  
Although there is a general understanding of what immersion is, there is no clear idea 
on what it actually is (Brown & Cairns, 2004). Some have described it as feeling deeply 
engaged, where the virtual world is perceived as real (Coomans & Timmermans, 1997), while 
others viewed it as the degree to which users interact with the virtual instead of physical 
environment (Guadagno, Blascovich, Bailenson, & McCall, 2007) or a sense of being 
“caught up” in the game world (McMahan, 2003, p. 68). Other scholars, like Slater (1999), 
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defined immersion as the objective description of the technology, while presence is the 
subjective experience. This study conceptualised immersion as the perception of being 
surrounded by the virtual environment and it can be described as the sense of being 
enveloped by and interacting with an environment (Witmer & Singer, 1998). In some 
literature, immersion is known as “telepresence” (Kim & Biocca, 1997) or “presence” 
(Witmer & Singer, 1998). Under the latter term, immersion has also been conceptualised as 
social richness, realism and transportation (Lombard & Ditton, 1997).  
The term "immersive" is often used to describe computer-synthesised environments 
where the user is perpetually surrounded by the virtual environment. In the CAVE (CAVE 
Automatic Virtual Environment), for instance, computer-generated visual imagery is 
projected onto the walls, ceiling and floor of a room in which a user perceives the projections 
as 3-D structures through the use of special glasses and where he or she can freely move 
(Loomis, Blascovich, & Beall, 1999). Alternatively, it could involve the use of a head-
mounted display used together with a computer and head-tracking device. Based on the 
position and orientation of the user's head, the computer generates and transmits visual and 
auditory images to the head-mounted display (Loomis, et al., 1999). However, "immersive" is 
not a term used exclusively to describe such virtual reality experience. As Lombard and 
Ditton (1997) point out, "Not only immersive virtual reality systems but also simulation rides, 
IMAX theatres, and even standard movie theatres can be said to immerse the senses of media 
users". "Immersive" has also been used to describe virtual worlds (Bardzell & Odom, 2008; 
Dalgarno & Lee, 2010) and MMORPGs (Minocha & Roberts, 2008; Munn, 2012) where 
users have the impression that they are part of a comprehensive, realistic experience due to 
sensory stimuli of the technologies and participants' ability to influence the virtual 
environment (Dawley & Dede, 2008).  
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Immersion is most notably known for its role in virtual reality (VR), which refers to 
immersive, interactive, multi-sensory 3-D environments. The degree of immersion produced 
often indicates the success of a VR system  (Burt, 1995). VR has been used as a therapeutic 
help tool to treat different psychological problems. Research has, for instance, been 
conducted on VR exposure therapy where phobias are treated psychologically. Some of the 
phobias that have seen VR treatment research include fear of post accident driving, fear of 
enclosed spaces, and fear of public speaking. Users are “systematically exposed to a specific 
feared stimuli within a contextually relevant setting” (Parsons & Rizzo, 2008, p. 251). 
Typically, a virtual scenario that contains the feared stimuli is generated and users interact in 
it. For example, in research to treat acrophobia (or fear of heights), patients were given 
gradual exposure to increasing heights. Studies have shown that immersion is necessary so 
that the patient experiences relevant emotions and emotional processing can occur (Krijn, 
Emmelkamp, Olafsson, & Biemond, 2004). Low levels of immersion are correlated with 
treatment dropout (Krijn, et al., 2004).  
Immersion has been studied in the context of television viewing, where larger screen 
sizes, for example, predicted immersion (Bracken & Atkin, 2004; Lombard, Reich, Grabe, 
Bracken, & Ditton, 2000). When shown short scenes of rapid point-of-view movement on a 
12-inch screen and a 46-inch screen, participants who watched the large screen reported that 
they felt greater physical movement, that they enjoyed the sense of movement more and that 
the scene was more exciting (Lombard, et al., 2000). Immersion is argued to affect emotions 
at a fundamental level that is related to emotional intensity, so higher immersion increases 
emotions caused by fictional events, as well as by the artefact through which the fictional 
world is presented (Visch, Tan, & Molenaar, 2010).  
A number of factors, including technological (e.g., screen size, degree of interactivity 
and panoramic displays; Slater, McCarthy, & Maringelli, 1998) and psychological (e.g., 
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attention, effort and time; Brown & Cairns, 2004) can create a sense of immersion. Other 
factors include isolation from the physical environment, natural means of interaction with and 
control of the environment, perception of inclusion and self-movement in the environment 
(Witmer & Singer, 1998). Isolation from the physical environment refers to the blocking out 
of stimuli from the environment such that users feel more immersed in the virtual 
environment. Interaction and control of the environment has to be smooth and natural, 
otherwise there will be distraction and immersion will be difficult. Interacting naturally with 
the virtual environment, affecting and allowing oneself to be affected by the stimuli will lead 
to greater immersion (Witmer & Singer, 1998). When mediated body movements are mapped 
on to actual body movements, it can affect perceptions and consequences of media exposure 
(Biocca, 1997). Recent studies have supported this argument. When using a controller that is 
more natural (e.g., a steering wheel for a driving game compared to a keyboard, joystick or 
gamepad), individuals experienced greater immersion (Skalski, Tamborini, Shelton, Buncher, 
& Lindmark, 2011). Sounds that accompany the change in landscape as the user moves (e.g., 
rain, rustling of leaves, or the shrieks and cries of monsters) help to contextualise the user in 
the artificial space (Grimshaw, 2010). Sounds triggered by actions of the user (e.g., walking, 
running or firing weapons) impact the synthetic environment and confer the user a 
participatory role in the game, adding to feelings of engagement and immersion (Grimshaw, 
2010).  
Gender and past experience with the media can predict immersion (Lachlan & 
Krcmar, 2008). As men have more interest in and are more likely to play online games, this 
can heighten their sense of involvement in the experience and affect immersion. Those 
familiar with the game and with interactive experiences easily adapt to the virtual 
environment and feel immersed in a short time (Lachlan & Krcmar, 2008). To the extent that 
users perceive themselves moving in the virtual environment and interacting with other 
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entities in that environment, immersion is increased. Photo- and audio-realism may not be 
necessary to achieve immersion (McMahan, 2003) though some suspension of disbelief is 
needed (Sheridan, 2000). Even the use of a language associated with the character or the 
simulated environment can invoke feelings of immersion. For example, the Star Wars role-
players in Second Life's Hutt Space use a language translator that masks the language they 
use as "huttese" (or the alien language of the Hutts in the Star Wars movie; Guitton, 2012). 
In games and virtual worlds, immersion is believed to bring about greater enjoyment 
and consequently positive attitudes towards the virtual environment (Schneider, Lang, Shin, 
& Bradley, 2004). In the context of MMORPGs and virtual worlds, avatars are central to 
immersion (Slater & Usoh, 1994; Taylor, 2003) and their many functions contribute to 
creating the perception of immersion. The avatar serves as a point of reference for the user, 
allowing the user to identify objects and other virtual beings in relation to the virtual self. It 
references the user’s position in the virtual world relative to other places, making it possible 
to navigate the virtual space through direction and orientation (Eastin, 2006). Importantly, it 
also carries the identity of the user. Previous research have found that the use of same-sex 
characters (Eastin, 2006) and positive attitude (Chung, 2005) increase feelings of 
transportation from the actual world to the virtual. This study, however, explores the sense of 
being surrounded by the virtual environment and examines another important aspect of 
avatar, specifically, the perception of avatar-self similarity and its effect on continuance 
intention via self-awareness and immersion. 
 
Self-presence 
Self-presence is defined as the psychological state where the virtual self is 
experienced as the real self (K. Lee, 2004). As self-presence is the perception of non-
mediation between avatar and self, users may feel that the avatar and themselves are the same 
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entity. Compared to social and environmental presence, the dimension of self-presence is 
relatively under-researched. Although there has been some discussion on theoretical aspects 
of self-presence (Tamborini & Bowman, 2010; Tamborini & Skalski, 2006), it remains 
scarce, as with empirical research in this area. A standardised measurement of the construct is 
still lacking.  
According to K. Lee (2004), in a virtual experience, the real self may experience the 
virtual through the mediation of technology or the experienced self may be artificially created 
by technology. The virtual self may be an artificial self or a representation of one’s own 
genuine self, physically apparent (i.e., where the whole or partial representation of the self is 
visible, for instance, avatars, or in shooting games where the hands of the user are visible) or 
psychologically assumed (i.e., where the physical representation is not visible but assumed, 
for instance, in first-person shooting games; K. Lee, 2004). It is the acknowledgement of 
these artificial selves by others in the virtual environment that makes the virtual identity real 
(Turkle, 1995).  
Empirical studies have shown that greater self-presence is related to the use of a self 
similar avatar (Ratan, et al., 2008), with greater intimacy experienced (Bailenson, Beall, 
Blascovich, Raimundo, & Weisbuch, 2001). Exposure to a pre-game story about the main 
characters of the game is associated with increased self-presence because the narratives 
absorb players into the game and make them feel they are the main character (Park, Lee, Jin, 
& Kang, 2010). Some studies have shown the mediating role of presence, for example, self-
presence mediates positive self-perception and parasocial interaction (Jin & Park, 2009). 
Other research on self-presence demonstrated that it mediates processes between empathy 
and flow (Jin, 2011), as well as between avatar customisation and game enjoyment (Bailey, 
Wise, & Bolls, 2009). These studies suggest that when one perceives the virtual experiences 
as one’s own, there is a sense that one’s physical being extends into the virtual environment. 
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This perception makes the experience more real and vivid for the user. When self-presence is 
high, the user feels that his or her real self is present in the virtual environment rather than 
just a digital representation.
1
 Through his or her senses, the user perceives the interaction 
between the virtual self and external stimuli, and has extrasensory perception of his or her 
actions and reactions in the world (Kim & Sundar, 2009).  
 
Identifiability 
Non-identifiability is the anonymity of self to others, though Williams (1988) argued 
that more than that, it is a state where one is free from the scrutiny and evaluation of social 
others. In the past, non-identifiability was generally in the form of letters and phone calls but 
with CMC, the possibilities were expanded for people dispersed in time and space to 
communicate without their identity being made known.   
Identifiability, or the state where one's identity is known to others, is examined in this 
study as it is a factor that can affect self-disclosure and deception. Much research on the 
impact of identifiability has been conducted in the field of CMC.  
Non-identifiability is an important component of deindividuation (Diener, 1979), 
which is the feeling of a diminished sense of individuality, of being submerged in a group. 
There are varying degrees of non-identifiability and the valence attached to it depends largely 
on the context (Marx, 1999).  
Non-identifiability has a number of benefits. When statements are delinked from the 
author, non-identifiability has been argued to aid in more unbiased judgement (e.g. in double-
blind reviews), facilitate in the divulging of personal information (e.g. in surveys), reduce 
fear of reprisals (e.g. in whistle-blowing) and encourage risk-taking and experimentation 
(Scott, 2004; Valacich, Jessup, Dennis, & Nunamaker, 1992). Identifiability can shield one 
                                                 
1
 It has to be noted though that self-presence does not entail identifiability (see next section). One may feel 
present in the virtual environment without simultaneously feeling that one’s identity is known by others. 
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from unwanted publicity or reprisal, protect privacy, and prevent harmful stigmatisation or 
discrimination. Additionally, it can reduce inhibition (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986) and 
evaluation anxiety (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991). Hence, it frees one to express the 
real self without being overly concerned about how others might view them, or being affected 
by physical features which would hinder interaction and discourage self-disclosure. In group 
communication, it offers a low-threat environment in which to share ideas and reduces 
evaluation anxiety (Pinsonneault & Heppel, 1997). The pressure to conform is removed and 
social barriers eliminated. Non-identifiability is responsible for the equalisation phenomenon, 
reducing inequalities of participation and social influence (Dubrovsky, et al., 1991). It is such 
advantages that make group support systems particularly attractive.  
On the other hand, non-identifiability hinders evaluations of credibility (Scott, 2004), 
encourages free-riding, hostility, flaming and cybersmearing. When people are non-
identifiable, they may feel that their contribution is not necessary for success (Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987) or cannot be traced to them. They feel less accountable and ride on the efforts 
of others (Lemley, 1999). They may make uninhibited or harsh comments, spread untruths 
and use caustic language to denigrate or ridicule others because reduction of social feedback 
and the perceived anonymity in CMC lower the sense of public self-awareness, breaking 
down the inhibition used to restrain such behaviour (E. J. Lee, 2004; Scott, 2004; Siegel, 
Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986; Valacich, et al., 1992). The perception of non-
identifiability can even be brought about by darkness, for example, through the simple act of 
wearing sunglasses, to result in undesirable behaviour (e.g., dishonesty and self-interested 
behaviours; Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010).  
Identifiability and its relation to deception (Bowker & Tuffin, 2003; Caspi & Gorsky, 
2006; Donath, 1999) and self-disclosure (Joinson, 2001b; Qian & Scott, 2007; Tidwell & 
Walther, 2002) has been studied extensively in CMC. In this study, its role as an intervening 
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variable of avatar similarity and outcomes of deception and self-disclosure is examined in the 
context of other mediators of self-awareness and self-presence. 
 
Continuance intention 
Continuance intention generally refers to the intention to continue using an 
information technology application or medium. Although initial acceptance of a technology 
promises success, ultimate viability depends on continued usage. At the individual level, 
continued use of a technology or medium is central to the survival of business to consumer 
companies running online businesses, such as Internet service providers, online gaming 
companies, online travel agencies and online retailers. Virtual worlds, for example, face a 
high attrition rate since they have no real objective, unlike games, and many people complain 
about not knowing what to do once they are there (Platoni, 2008). Although the freedom to 
create and author one's own adventures attracts many, the number who stay on and become 
long-term users is low. Many people just try them once to find out what they are about and 
then never return. As acquiring new customers is more expensive than retaining existing ones 
(Parthasarathy & Bhattacherjee, 1998), it is critical to encourage users' continual usage so as 
to maintain a stable user base and to reap long-term profits (Jung, 2011). Thus, encouraging 
continuance intention in such environments would benefit these organisations immensely as 
they require a critical mass of users to remain viable. Individuals also gain from a thriving 
virtual environment as it ensures a good mix of users with different objectives. 
Contrary to what some researchers believe, post-adoptive use does not always 
increase over time. In fact, its use may decrease. Various features of the application may be 
resisted, treated with disinterest or routinised within other work activities. They may also be 
restricted within a narrow scope, supported or extended (Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 2005).  
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In information systems, prior use is a predictor of continuance intention (Kim & 
Malhotra, 2005; Oliver, 1980; Venkatesh, Morris, & Ackerman, 2000). Prior use of a 
software, for example, drives sustained usage behaviour (Venkatesh, et al., 2000). Davis and 
Venkatesh (2004) also found hands-on experience to be a key driver of sustained use. Having 
experienced the application (or product), there may be satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
depending on whether it meets the expectations of the user. Satisfaction would increase the 
inclination to continue its use. Researchers (e.g., Bhattacherjee, 2001b; Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 
2009; Thong, Hong, & Tam, 2006) draw on expectation confirmation theory, which states 
that individuals' intention to continue using an application or product is dependent on 
satisfaction with the product in prior use. As such, individuals with a higher level of 
satisfaction with a product are more likely than dissatisfied individuals to continue using it. 
Users satisfied with web-based learning, for example, are more likely to continue with it 
(Chiu, Chiu, & Chang, 2007). Similarly, user satisfaction with a service, through judgements 
about payment equity, translates to high future usage levels (Bolton & Lemon, 1999). 
The awareness of being in the mediated environment leads to more favourable 
feelings, which can influence continuance intention (Jung, 2011) . It can also affect 
continuance intention via satisfaction. As users may expect the perception of being 
transported into the virtual (i.e., the feeling of "being there"), their satisfaction may be 
affected by the degree to which they have such an experience (Jung, 2011).  
Perceived usefulness has also been identified to predict continuance intention directly 
and through its effect on satisfaction (Bhattacherjee, 2001a, 2001b; Thong, et al., 2006). 
Perceived usefulness is believed to affect continuance intention since there are extrinsic 
rewards (e.g., pay rise, promotions) related to enhanced performance (Vroom, 1967). Another 
continuance intention predictor is perceived playfulness. Individuals experiencing playfulness 
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are more absorbed and interested in the interaction, and are more likely to feel good engaging 
in it. This could form the intention to re-visit or re-use (Lin, Wu, & Tsai, 2005).  
Habit has been found to be a strong predictor of future use in many studies (e.g., Liao, 
Palvia, & Lin, 2006; Limayem & Cheung, 2008). When behaviour is performed many times 
and becomes habitual, subsequent behaviour is guided by automated cognitive processes 
(Aarts, Verplanken, & Knippenberg, 1998). When habit is strong, people rely much more on 
it than on external information and choice strategies (Gefen, 2004). They are also likely to 
form favourable intentions about acts they have performed frequently in the past (Ouellette & 
Wood, 1998). Through either cognitive consistency pressure (Festinger, 1957) or self-
perception processes (Bem, 1972), they might produce consistent intentions for future 
purposes (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). For instance, a user may think: I play this game every 
day, therefore I must like it.  
Continuance intention in virtual worlds can also be affected by perceived enjoyment 
(Barnes, 2011; Shen & Eder, 2009). Through multi-sensory channels, virtual worlds can 
provide stimuli (e.g., sounds, colours, captivating graphics and animation), which users seek. 
The enjoyment of the medium can lead to continuance intention (Barnes, 2011). Some 
scholars conceived of virtual worlds as a place to which users get attached because of 
meaningful activities that have taken place there, and features of the place have influenced 
the activities (Goel, Johnson, Junglas, & Ives, 2011). A person would want to return because 
of the experiences there. As cognitive absorption underlies such experiences in a virtual 
world, it would lead to the intention to return (Goel, et al., 2011).  
This study examines continuance intention as avatars' impact on self-awareness may 
have an effect on immersion and continuance intention. Moreover, researchers have long 
suggested a link between avatars and immersion (e.g., Slater & Usoh, 1994; Taylor, 2003) 
even though empirical evidence remains scant. By investigating the influence of avatars on 
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In the previous chapter, an outline of the relevant theories and concepts provides the 
background to this study. This research examines underlying mechanisms through which 
avatar-self-similarity affects deception, self-disclosure, and continuance intention. Drawing 
on the theory of self-awareness, and concepts of self-presence, identifiability and immersion, 
the relationships bridging avatar similarity and deception, self-disclosure and continuance 
intention are hypothesised using three separate research models. 
 
Deception model 
In this model, the relationship between avatar and deception is investigated. 
Mediating factors of self-awareness and self-presence are expected to influence the 
relationship between avatar similarity and deception. At the same time, avatar similarity is 
anticipated to affect identifiability and impact deception. 
 
Avatar-self similarity 
People create many different selves online, often with new identities. They live out 
their multiple virtual lives through their avatars (e.g., as a vampire, a fleet commander or a 
shaman), just as they play different roles in real life. These virtual lives could vary in terms of 
appearances, behaviour and values from one another, and even from one’s real life, making it 
possible to evaluate the differences and similarities between them. 
Previous studies have examined similarity in terms of personality (Strauss, Barrick, & 
Connerley, 2001), attitude (Byrne, Griffitt, & Stefaniak, 1967), ideal self (Herbst, Gaertner, 
& Insko, 2003), as well as appearance (Crosby, Evans, & Cowles, 1990). Taking into 
consideration the malleability of avatars, not only in appearance but also personality, the 
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study examined similarity as comprising two distinct dimensions of physical similarity and 
homophily. This would allow us to tease out the different effects of both dimensions. 
Appearance similarity therefore is conceptualised as the degree of physical resemblance 
between an individual and the avatar, while homophily refers to the similarity in beliefs, 
values and attitudes. 
Similarity can be construed as subjective (perceived) or objective (Rogers & 
Bhowmik, 1970). Perceived similarity refers to the degree to which a member of a dyad 
perceives the other as being similar in terms of attributes whereas objective homophily refers 
to the degree of observable similarities between the two (Rogers & Bhowmik, 1970). A 
number of studies found that perceived, rather than actual similarity had a stronger effect on 
behaviour. Perceived personality homophily, for instance, was associated with greater 
friendship intensity than actual similarity in personality (Selfhout, Denissen, Branje, & 
Meeus, 2009). Similarly, higher subordinate performance evaluations by superiors were 
linked with perceived, rather than actual, similarity (Turban & Jones, 1988). Other research 
on avatars have, likewise, used perceived similarity (e.g., Fox & Bailenson, 2009; Vasalou & 
Joinson, 2009). 
Perceived appearance similarity is postulated to be related to homophily in this study. 
When making judgements on others, there is a general concern to reduce uncertainty or to 
increase predictability about the behaviour of others and themselves (Berger & Calabrese, 
1975). As such, people rely extensively on cues from appearance (Burgoon, Buller, & 
Woodall, 1996; Hassin & Trope, 2000; Todorov, 2008; Willis & Todorov, 2006) and 
behaviour (Dabbs, Bernieri, Strong, Campo, & Milun, 2001; Waxer, 1977) in such inferences 
of social judgement. They make judgements of others' personality traits (Watson, 1989) and 
complex social characteristics, such as trustworthiness (Todorov, 2008), warmth and power 
(Berry, 1991). These judgements can be surprisingly accurate, even when observations are 
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based on brief excerpts of less than five minutes, and where there is no interaction between 
the parties (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000). In fact, reaction to such visual information 
is so instinctive that appearance and physical features are processed rapidly, automatically 
and require little or no cognitive effort (Patterson, 1995). 
Since people routinely make such inferences based on appearances, they might apply 
such strategies in the mediated environment as well. In the absence of the corporeal body, 
people make use of whatever information the medium or interface provides for social 
judgement (Nowak, 2004). Nickname, profile and pictures on homepages and social network 
sites (Antheunis, Valkenburg, & Peter, 2010; Sherman et al., 2001), user name, and domain 
name (Donath, 1999) are often used as cues for more information. In virtual environments 
where a digital representation is employed, people continue to apply familiar indicators that 
they use offline for social judgement, i.e., the familiar and stable indicators of face and body 
(Bélisle & Bodur, 2010; Suler, 1996; Waskul & Douglass, 1997). Thus, when people create a 
self-resembling avatar, they might infer from its appearance a personality and characteristics 
that are similar to themselves.  
One of the characteristics of social judgement is that people generalise from 
themselves to others through social projection. Such projection is highly automatic (Krueger, 
1998), i.e., it is unintentional, uncontrollable, occurs efficiently and outside of awareness 
(Bargh, 1994). People use information about the self to make inferences about other people as 
it may be the best information they can have about other people (Dawes, 1989; Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003). They perceive their own responses to be relatively common and 
appropriate, and view alternative responses to be uncommon and inappropriate. Such biases 
justify their feelings that their behavioural choices are appropriate and rational responses to 
the environment (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). As their perceptions are based on a clear 
and unbiased understanding of the situation at hand, people believe that other rational beings 
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would generally share the same feelings and opinions (Gilovich, Jennings, & Jennings, 1983; 
Krueger & Clement, 1997; Ross & Ward, 1995). Further, there is a tendency to associate with 
similar others, selectively exposing oneself to those who hold opinions or positions similar to 
one's own (Deutsch, 1988; Marks & Miller, 1987), contributing to the perception that others 
would behave the same way. People may also anchor on their own perspective and make 
adjustments to account for differences between themselves and others until a plausible 
estimate is reached (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Nickerson, 1999). 
People tend to think that others are like them. Just as people are likely to generalise 
their opinions and positions to others, they may also make such generalisations to their 
avatars, particularly if they are self-similar. Using their own dispositions as data, people 
generally make quick predictions about what others are like and what they are likely to do 
(Robbins & Krueger, 2005). In the same way, people may rely on their own temperament and 
thoughts to project their personality and idiosyncrasies on their avatars. They may also utilise 
cues from avatar appearance to make judgements of personality and trait similarity.  
If the avatar resembles the self, it is easy, and perhaps even natural, to assume that 
other traits would be similar as well. Ames (2004a, 2004b) proposed the similarity 
contingency model, which predicts that when people perceive a high level of general 
similarity to a target, they engage in high levels of projection but when they perceive a low 
level of similarity, they engage in stereotyping. The self is seen as a basic template to 
understand another's unseen mental state. Moreover, self and stereotype representations are 
readily accessible and require little cognitive effort. The sense of general similarity thus 
regulates the use of self or stereotype representations, with similarity triggering social 
projection. This suggests that when people use a self-similar avatar, they would engage in 
high levels of projection. Boellstorff’s ethnographic work supports this argument. He noted 
that "when residents … created alts that did not sound or look 'like themselves,' the 
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implication was that the avatar in question was 'alternative' to their primary avatar as much as 
their actual-world self" (2008, p. 133).  
The following is therefore postulated 
H1: Appearance similarity will be positively associated with homophily. 
 
The Impact of Homophily on Deception via Private Self-awareness and Self-presence 
Homophily with the avatar entails that the manner in which the avatar behaves is 
closely tied to one's emotions, attitudes and beliefs. The avatar reflects the user's cognitive 
state and behaves as the user would. With little homophily, the avatar may be made to behave 
in non-normative ways from the self. When user and avatar are homophilous, the user 
consults his or her decision-making processes, emotional reaction and value system when 
deciding on the avatar's behaviour and responses in the virtual environment. This inward 
focus of attention on feelings and thoughts can heighten private self-awareness.  
Private self-awareness is attention focused on the private and covert aspects of the 
self. When self-aware, individuals are reflective and introspective, with little cognitive 
resources left to pay attention to their immediate physical environment or to others' 
impression of them. As noted earlier, a consequence of self-awareness is the clarification of 
knowledge (Buss, 2001). Individuals who are self-aware are more accurate in the assessment 
of their internal states (Gibbons, et al., 1979) and changes in bodily experiences (Scheier, et 
al., 1979). As such, self-aware individuals are sensitive to the effect of the stimuli of the 
synthetic environment. As a result, they are more aware of the virtual experience and their 
involvement in it, slipping easily into their virtual self. It can be said that those who are high 
in self-awareness would feel that they are present in the virtual environment as they lose track 
of themselves in the real world. They experience self-presence. Thus, they no longer perceive 
61 
 
the digital representation in the artificial environment as virtual.
2
 Taken together, it is posited 
that: 
H2: Homophily will be positively associated with private self-awareness. 
H3: Private self-awareness will be positively associated with self-presence.  
When one experiences self-presence, there is the perception of non-mediation and 
whatever physical movements of the avatar are perceived to be the user's own, such that the 
user feels that the self and the avatar are the same being. Rather than just a digital self-
representation, the user feels that the actual self is in the virtual environment, and the 
engagement of the senses by the virtual environment is taken to be real. As the user feels 
himself to be partaking of the virtual activities, this makes the virtual experience more vivid 
and satisfactory, which should generate positive emotions. Since people are less likely to lie 
when they experience positive emotions, there should be reduced deception. 
Additionally, when the avatar resembles the user, it becomes like a "virtual me". 
There is close psychological distance and the user perceives little discrepancy between the 
actual self and the virtual self. Hence there may be less tendency to lie. Conversely, if the 
avatar is markedly different from the actual self as to constitute a "new me", there is greater 
discrepancy between the actual and virtual self. As others in the virtual environment see only 
the virtual self, one has greater liberty to choose to lie or be truthful.  
Further, using an avatar that has a close physical and psychological distance with the 
user should make him or her feel more comfortable and secure. Such feelings of security may 
encourage people to be more open and prosocial, and ultimately reduce deception (Gillath, et 
al., 2010). The following is therefore postulated. 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that the concepts of self-awareness and self-presence are distinct. While it is possible for 
one to experience both self-awareness and self-presence, it is equally possible to experience either state. For 
example, with a self-similar avatar in Wii, one may experience both self-awareness and self-presence. Playing 
Super Mario Brothers, one may experience self-presence but is less likely to experience self-awareness. On the 




H4: Self-presence will be negatively associated with deception. 
Empirical studies have produced mixed findings about the effect of self-awareness on 
deception. On the one hand, it has been argued that self-awareness is associated with a 
greater ability to deceive (Johnson et al., 2005) as self-awareness is linked with greater 
introspection (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979). Since self-awareness is closely 
tied to understanding one's own thoughts, it is assumed to "give rise to the ability to reflect on 
the thoughts of others" (Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003, p. 78). This mental state attribution or 
theory of mind is useful in deception to determine what another individual in a similar 
situation is thinking. Johnson et al. (2005) have shown that individuals with high private self-
awareness are better deceivers.  
On the other hand, self-awareness is believed to bring about greater adherence to 
personal standards of behaviour (Carver, 1974). When individuals are reflective and 
introspective, they are more aware of their own internal standards and more likely to abide by 
these standards. For instance, when self-aware, individuals cheated less (Batson, et al., 1999), 
behaved in a manner consistent with their personal attitude (Froming, et al., 1982) and 
adhered to appropriate personal standards. When people attend to their moral standards, they 
will adhere to a stricter delineation of honest and dishonest behaviour (Mazar, Amir, & 
Ariely, 2008). Typically, honesty is valued and people believe strongly in their own morality. 
As such, they would want to maintain this aspect of their self-concept, which would also 
allow them to see themselves as good people (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Consequently, 
those who are more self-aware display more honesty in their interactions.  
Although previous studies have produced mixed findings with regard to the effect of 
self-awareness on deception, a majority of empirical studies have shown that self-awareness 
decreases deception as cognisance of internal values and standards is increased. Therefore, 
the study posits that:  
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H5: Self-awareness will be negatively associated with deception. 
 
The Impact of Homophily on Deception via Identifiability 
An avatar can be altered and customised in many ways that can render it similar to, 
partially similar to, or different from the user. Due to its plasticity, the use of an avatar alone 
does not completely reveal the true identity about the user (Midha & Nandedkar, 2012). As 
such, having a similar-looking avatar may not be adequate to derive perceptions of 
identifiability. Instead, the extent that the avatar mirrors the user's psychological or 
behavioural traits may be more instrumental in making the user feel identifiable. The avatar 
that more accurately reflects the user (e.g., in attitudes or values) may make the user feel less 
anonymous to others (or more identifiable). When an avatar is homophilous with the user, its 
behaviour, reaction or discursive patterns are typical of the user, thus bringing about such 
perceptions. As such, it is postulated that  
H6: Homophily will be positively associated with identifiability. 
Non-identifiability obscures personal features and interpersonal differences, thereby 
diminishing the relative importance of interpersonal concerns (Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & De 
Groot, 2001). People are emboldened to act in ways they usually would not because they feel 
that they cannot be identified and hence cannot be held accountable. Online, people lie, cheat 
and sabotage others' play because they can get away with it easily. As they are not 
identifiable, all they risk is a banned account after which they can easily re-register using a 
new false name. Identifiability, however, attaches a real-life identity to the online persona. 
Wrong-doings can then be linked to the person behind it and there is actual consequence to 
one's reputation. Hence, it is hypothesised that 
H7:  Identifiability will be negatively associated with deception. 




















The model for self-disclosure examines how self-similar avatars affect self-disclosure 
with mediators of identifiability, self-awareness and self-presence. Although the variables 
remain largely the same as for the deception model, they are expected to affect self-disclosure 
differently. Avatar similarity is expected to heighten self-awareness, which should increase 
self-disclosure. Self-awareness should also elevate feelings of self-presence and lead to high 
self-disclosure. As well, avatar similarity is anticipated to increase identifiability which 
should reduce self-disclosure.  
Since H1-H3 and H6 are essentially the same for the self-disclosure model as for the 
deception model, they shall not be elaborated upon again. Instead, the discussion shall centre 
on the hypothesised relationship between self-presence and self-disclosure, self-awareness 





























The Impact of Private Self-awareness and Self-presence on Self-disclosure 
A number of studies have linked self-awareness with self-disclosure (Davis & 
Franzoi, 1986; Franzoi, et al., 1985; Joinson, 2001b). Adolescents with high private self-
consciousness were found to self-disclose more to their peers than did low private self-
conscious adolescents (e.g., Davis & Franzoi, 1986). Similar findings were obtained when 
studies were conducted with college students. Compared to those who do not habitually 
attend to their own private thoughts and feelings, college couples who do, self-disclosed more 
and experienced increased satisfaction with the relationship (Franzoi, et al., 1985).  
Past research has found individuals high in self-awareness to have well-articulated 
self-concepts (Franzoi, 1983) and to be more aware of their own behaviour and personality 
(Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Franzoi, 1983; Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978). This makes them 
better equipped to self-disclose. As well, their inclination to engage in personal thoughts and 
feelings might indicate that they are more willing to be included in activities that involve the 
expression of these internal states (Davis & Franzoi, 1986). This presents an opportunity to 
receive feedback from others, so that misperceptions and inaccuracies can be corrected, 
leading to greater self-knowledge. Thus, high self-awareness can facilitate the sharing of 
intimate information, which reduces loneliness and increases satisfaction with the 
relationship (Franzoi, et al., 1985).  
Self-disclosure under conditions of high self-awareness is often marked by greater 
accuracy and reliability. As disparities may arise between past behaviour and self-report, a 
self-aware person would be motivated to align the two. Since past behaviour is relatively 
fixed, the consistency is brought about through changing of the self-report, i.e., by aligning 
the self-report to past behaviour (Pryor, et al., 1977). Self-focused individuals showed greater 
consistency in self-reports on sociability and subsequent sociable behaviour (Pryor, et al., 
1977). Heightened self-awareness increased the accuracy of self-assessment of normal people 
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(Pryor, et al., 1977) and psychiatric patients' self-reports on hospitalisation history and 
descriptions of their problems (Gibbons et al., 1985). Re-test reliability of self-reports is also 
higher for self-conscious individuals (Hjelle & Bernard, 1994). It is therefore hypothesised 
that  
H8: Self-awareness will be positively associated with self-disclosure. 
An avatar whose appearance is similar to the self and whose movements give the 
perception that one is physically in the virtual environment can narrow the physical and 
psychological distance between self and avatar. Using such an avatar can increase the degree 
of confluence between self and avatar, and make using the avatar a familiar and comfortable 
experience, triggering feelings of security. People who feel secure about themselves are likely 
to be more self-disclosing (Bauminger, Finzi-Dottan, Chason, & Har-Even, 2008; Mikulincer 
& Nachshon, 1991). 
While the association between self-awareness and self-disclosure has been 
demonstrated (Davis & Franzoi, 1986; Franzoi, et al., 1985; Joinson, 2001b), the effect of 
self-awareness on self-disclosure through self-presence remains unknown. However, the role 
of self-presence needs to be investigated as the avatar-self distance might be further reduced 
with an avatar that induces self-presence due to greater intimacy with the avatar (Bailenson, 
et al., 2001), which can consequently lead to more disclosure. 
H9: Self-presence will be positively associated with self-disclosure. 
 
The impact of homophily on self-disclosure via identifiability 
Online, being non-identifiable makes it easier to share intimate, personal information 
as one need not deal with direct repercussions. One can easily log out and retreat to the safety 
of the offline world when the situation becomes uncomfortable. The insulation between the 
online and offline world provides a sense of security. The anonymity of others also helps 
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people share more deeply as they perceive themselves not to be talking to an actual person 
since others are nameless and faceless. 
Non-identifiability preserves the dyadic boundary between self and others. Non-
identifiable others help to keep the self-disclosure within a boundary as they are not able to 
link the disclosed to the actual person disclosing nor the people within one's social circle. It is 
in this boundary that people feel safe to disclose to others and trust that the self-disclosure 
would be kept within it (Derlega & Chaikin, 1977). Encounters with strangers further 
eliminate future vulnerability, reducing fear that the information disclosed would be leaked to 
friends and acquaintances. This accounts for the “stranger on the train” phenomenon where 
people find it relatively easy to disclose to strangers on trains or planes, where their identity 
is not made known. Much research has focused on the role of non-identifiability in 
encouraging self-disclosure (Booth-Kewley, Edwards, & Rosenfeld, 1992; Derlega & 
Chaikin, 1977). It is therefore hypothesised that: 
H10: Increased identifiability will be negatively associated with self-disclosure. 







































Continuance intention model 
The model for continuance intention investigates the effect of avatar-self similarity on 
the intention for continued media use. Theoretical constructs of self-awareness and 
immersion are explored as possible mediators. In this model, avatar similarity is expected to 
increase self-awareness, which should augment feelings of immersion and lead to continued 
intention to use. 
As with the self-disclosure model, in this model, H1 and H2 are similar to the 
deception model so these hypotheses will not be discussed again. The focus will be on the 
postulated relationships among self-awareness, immersion and intention.  
 
The impact of self-awareness on intention via immersion. 
When people are privately self-aware, they focus their attention inwards and are made 
aware of their perceptions, emotions and inner states. One of the consequences of private 
self-awareness is heightened emotional response (Scheier & Carver, 1977). Self-aware, 
compared to non self-aware, individuals have greater responsivity to affect.  
When made self-aware, people are self-reflective and introspective, and pay less 
attention to their physical surroundings. At the same time, research in self-awareness suggests 
that people will be more receptive to the stimuli of the media when made self-aware. Thus, 
self-aware individuals are likely to be cognisant of their mental processes, which should be 
on the avatar and the world it is in. They perceive the virtual environment acutely even as 
they lose track of the real world. These factors combine to predispose them to slip easily into 
the virtual environment. It follows then that those who are self-aware will experience greater 




This line of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis. 
H11: Self-awareness is positively associated with immersion. 
People play games for leisure and pleasure, often deriving a sense of community with 
other players (Hsu & Lu, 2004). The virtual experience, consisting of 3-D simulations and 
artificially created objects, is vivid, involving an active and affective psychological state (Li, 
Daugherty, & Biocca, 2002). For some users, it can even be richer than direct experience as 
they can make use of the interface properties and affordances to manipulate, examine and 
change features (e.g., colour) of the product (Li, et al., 2002). When people are immersed in 
the virtual world, it captures their attention and they are involved in the unfolding of events.    
Prior research has found that the perception of "being there" (Steuer, 1992) can lead 
to a perceptual or behavioural change in users of online tools, like websites or virtual reality 
applications. For example, Suh and Lee (2005) maintained that this perception enhanced 
consumer learning in an online store; Li et al (2002) found it to be associated with positive 
brand attitude while Klein (2003) showed that the greater such perceptions from simulated 
product experiences, the stronger were users' beliefs in the product advertising claims and the 
more intense were their product attitudes. This perception of "being there" is also associated 
with continuance usage (Jung, 2011), where it leads to satisfaction with the virtual world, 
which encourages return. Investigating the motivations of play among MMORPG players, 
Yee (2006) found one of users' main purpose is immersion", which is to be in a fantasy world 
and be someone else.  
Since the perception of "being there" can arouse continuance intentions, immersion, 
whereby the user feels surrounded by the virtual environment would be even more likely to 
bring about continuance intention. Further, the sense of being enveloped by the virtual 
environment is a positive experience which can increase involvement and make the virtual 
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experience more real and intense, thereby leading to the intention to revisit. Thus it is 
hypothesised that 
H12: Immersion is positively associated with intention to continue use of the virtual 
 environment. 


































A survey methodology was used in this study. Although this methodology does not 
involve direct observation of truthful and deceptive behaviour, nor does it measure the 
objective amount of self-disclosure, it allows a large population to be targeted and the 
gathering of information on people's past behaviour and future intention on a number of 
issues. As the study is conducted in a virtual world, which draws users from all over the 
world, it is logical to use a survey methodology as this allows participation from the 
population.  
Some scholars may have reservations about the use of surveys for assessing deception 
since deceptive respondents might not be providing accurate information about their 
communicative behaviour in the first place. However, the deployment of a web-based survey 
can aid in reducing impression management (Booth-Kewley, et al., 1992) and responding in 
socially desirable ways (Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991), with more 
truthful reports produced (Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). Survey methodology has been used in a 
number of studies involving deception, for example, to investigate misrepresentation in 
online and offline situations (Cornwell & Lundgren, 2001), dishonesty in chatrooms (Whitty, 
2002) and frequency of deceptive behaviour (Lewis & George, 2008). 
Similarly, survey methodology has been used widely to study self-disclosure, for 
instance, cross-cultural self-disclosure (Chen, 1995), disclosure between intimate partners 
(Sprecher, 1987), and the link between self-disclosure and subsequent depression (Wei, 
Russell, & Zakalik, 2005). It has also been used to examine continuance intention in different 
settings, such as web-based learning (Chiu & Wang, 2008), electronic commerce 




Data collection and sample 
 Data for this study were collected using a web survey, which took about 20 minutes 
to complete. Respondents were 209 users of Second Life, recruited in-world through 
solicitation at various places in Second Life. They were approached at Second Life locations, 
such as malls, beaches and amusement parks. Interested users were given the Web address of 
the survey, which they can access and complete at their convenience. In-world money of 100 
Lindens (Second Life currency, or the equivalent of 50 cents) was given to respondents who 
completed the survey.  
Purposive sampling was used to recruit users who were at least 21 years of age and 
whose avatars were at least a month old. The aim of the latter criterion was to ensure that 
respondents have some Second Life experience to tap on when responding to the survey. 
Avatar age was determined by examining a user's profile, which indicates the date when the 
avatar was created. Although it is not a definite indicator of the user's in-world experience 
(since it could be the user's second or even third avatar), it allowed for a quick and 
convenient way to weed out unsuitable users. In any case, the status of a new avatar (or noob) 
is so stigmatised that many users would take pains to note in their profile that the user is not a 
noob even though the avatar is new. Snowball sampling was also used, albeit to a limited 
extent, as some respondents subsequently referred friends to participate in the survey.  
Of the respondents, 48% were North Americans, 31% were Europeans and 14% 
Asians, Australians and New Zealanders, with the remaining 7% from other regions, 
including those who did not respond to this question. Respondents were predominantly 
female (64%), with average age between 21 and 29, and have at least high school education 
or a diploma. They typically spend more than five hours on a visit to Second Life and used 
their avatars mainly for socialising. More than half (53%) of those who responded to the 
73 
 
question indicated that they have been in Second Life every day for the past month. The 
figures indicate an alarmingly high usage on a daily basis even though it must be noted that 
using Second Life can be a time-consuming activity, and spending a few hours in-world may 
be considered reasonable. 
 
Measures 
 For all the measures, the variables were assessed with multiple-item scales. With the 
exception of the continuance intention scale, all measures were adapted from scales validated 
in previous studies. Wording was changed to ensure that they were appropriate for virtual 
environments. As a combination of scales was used in some cases, separate factor analyses 
were performed on the three models using principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation. Items with high cross-loadings were removed and those with factor loadings smaller 
than .70 were not included in the SEM. With the exception of one item of homophily (0.69) 
in the intention model, all factor loadings in the deception, self-disclosure and intention 
models were larger than .70. The item was retained as it was close to the .70 cutoff. To 
determine convergent and discriminant validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) was 
calculated. The AVE indicates the amount of variance accounted for in the indicators by the 
latent construct. A more conservative measure than Cronbach's alpha, it should be .50 or 
above for a construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The square root of the AVE for each 
construct should be higher than its correlations with other constructs to reflect discriminant 
validity. All measurement items, descriptive statistics, correlations table as well as the square 





Four items from three separate scales in Messinger et al (2008) were used to assess 
the degree of physical similarity. Questions in the original scales include "Is your Avatar 
similar to or different from your real self in the following dimensions?” and "Overall, would 
you say that your primary avatar is (check one)”. These were changed to "To what extent is 
your avatar in Second Life similar to your real self in the following dimensions?" and 
"Overall, would you say that your primary avatar in Second Life is (check one)”. Five-point 
Likert type scales ranging from very similar (1) to very different (5) were used. 
 
Homophily 
Perceived similarity in terms of values, beliefs, and attitudes was measured with seven 
items adapted from McCroskey, McCroskey, and Richmond's (2006) Measurement of 
Homophily. The original items, such as “This person thinks like me” and "This person 
behaves like me" were modified to become "My avatar in Second Life thinks like me" and 
"My avatar in Second Life behaves like me". Items were each accompanied by a five-point 
scale (1 = Agree, 5 = Disagree).  
 
Self-awareness 
Three items from Govern and Marsch’s (2001) Situational Self-awareness scale were 
adapted to assess the degree to which people were conscious of themselves while using their 
avatar in Second Life. This three-item scale was used instead of the more popular Fenigstein, 
Scheier and Buss' (1975) self-consciousness scale, as the latter was developed to measure 
state self-awareness, and may not be suitable for this study. Items in the original scale, such 
as "Right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings" and "Right now, I am reflective about 
my life" became "When I am using my avatar in Second Life, I am conscious of my inner 
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feelings" and "When I am using my avatar in Second Life, I am reflective about my life". 
Five-point Likert scales ranging from Agree (1) to Disagree (5) were used. 
 
Identifiability 
Identifiability was measured using three items from Whelan and Thompson (2009) 
that could be appropriately modified to suit the context of Second Life. For instance, “I feel 
that my responses are unidentifiable from the responses of others” and "My responses will 
blend in with the responses of other people" were changed to "I am unidentifiable from others 
in Second Life" and "I blend in with other people in Second Life". The items, measured on a 
five-point scale (1= Agree, 5 = Disagree), were reverse coded to represent the extent users 
feel they were anonymous to others. 
 
Self-presence  
Five items on 5-point scales ranging from absolutely (1) to not at all (5) from Jin and 
Park (2009), and Ratan and Hasler (2010) were combined to measure the degree users feel 
that the avatar's movements were theirs. Original items from Jin and Park, such as "While 
you were playing the game, how much did you feel as if you were walking when your own 
avatar walked?" and "While you were playing the game, how much did you feel as if you 
were moving when your avatar moved?" were modified to become "While using Second Life, 
how much did you feel as if you were walking when your own avatar walked?" and "While 
using Second Life, how much did you feel as if you were moving when your avatar moved?". 
For the scale from Ratan and Hasler, an item like "When playing the game/using the virtual 
environment, how much do you feel like your avatar is an extension of your body within the 
game/virtual environment?" was changed to "While using Second Life, how much did you 





Two items adapted from Lewis and George (2008) were used. Other items from the 
original scale were not included due to low factor loadings. These items were "While 
speaking to another person face-to-face, have you lied about your job?" and "While speaking 
to another person face-to-face, have you lied about your interests?". The first was modified to 
become "While speaking to a stranger in Second Life, have you lied about your occupation?" 
as not every one may be working and have a job. The second item was changed to "While 
speaking to a stranger in Second Life, have you lied about your interests?". As a topic like 
marital status may be lied about, an item was added ("Have you lied about your marital 
status?"). Since deception includes acts of exaggeration and feigning of emotions, an 
additional item was included ("Have you exaggerated or lied about your abilities?"). Also 
included was another item enquiring about misrepresentation in general ("Have you 
misrepresented yourself in any other way?"). Each item was accompanied by a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = All the time to 5 = Never).  
 
Self-disclosure  
Willingness to disclose to a stranger was assessed using eight items from the 10-item 
self-disclosure index (Miller, Berg, & Archer, 1983). The main question of the items “Extent 
of disclosure in the past to a same-sex friend” was changed to "To what extent have you 
disclosed the following to a stranger in Second Life?". Each item was accompanied by a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = Disclose fully and completely to 5 = Not disclose at all). Two items 






The scale for immersion, conceptualised as the perception of being surrounded by the 
virtual environment, was made up of a combination of items from Nowak and Biocca (2003), 
Slater, Usoh, and Chrysanthou (1995) and Slater and Usoh (1994). Items asked about the 
degree users feel they were inside the virtual environment and the perception of it being a 
place they have visited. Items from Nowak and Biocca, for instance, "To what extent did you 
feel surrounded by the environment you saw/heard?" and "To what extent did you feel like 
you were inside the environment you saw/heard?" were changed to "While using Second 
Life, to what extent did you feel surrounded by the virtual environment?" and "While using 
Second Life, to what extent did you feel like you were inside the virtual environment?". An 
original scale item taken from Slater, Usoh, and Chrysanthou, was changed to "While using 
Second Life, to what extent were there times when the virtual reality became the 'reality' for 
you, and you almost forgot about the 'real world' where you physically are?" from the original 
"To what extent were there times during the experience when the virtual reality became the 
'reality' for you, and you almost forgot about the 'real world' of the laboratory in which the 
whole experience was really taking place?". Slater and Usoh's original item "When you think 
back about your experience, do you think of the computer generated world more as 
something that you saw, or more as somewhere that you visited?" was changed to "While 
using Second Life, to what extent did you feel that the virtual environment seemed to be 
'somewhere I visited' rather than 'something I saw'?". Five items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
Absolutely to 5 = Not at all) were used.  
 
Continuance intention 
Three items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Agree (1) to Disagree (5) were 




Interviewee selection and procedure 
In order to have a clearer understanding of the survey results and especially to 
understand how the context of interaction may influence certain behaviours, interviews were 
conducted with role-players who responded to the survey. 
A question in the survey asked for a percentage breakdown on time spent on 
particular activities, e.g., socialising, role-play and working. Respondents who spent at least 
10% of their time role-playing, and who have indicated in the survey that they were willing to 
participate in a follow-up interview were shortlisted. As users may not respond to notecards 
or messages sent when they were offline, multiple searches were conducted to identify the 
respondents who were online at particular times. These respondents were sent private 
messages reminding them of the survey they had completed earlier and asking if they would 
like to participate in the follow-up interview. Arrangement was then made for a mutually 
convenient time to have the interview.  
Eleven respondents were interviewed over a period of slightly over a month. Each 
interview took place over private message in Second Life. Before each interview, a brief was 
sent via private message to the interviewees detailing the purpose of the research, the 
duration of participation and the processes to protect privacy of the participants. In view of 
the privacy protection clause, avatar names have been withheld and only their initials were 
used in this study. The duration for each interview was about two hours.  
 
Statistical analysis 
The fit of the measurement models was tested with SEM. Using Analysis of Moment 
Structures (AMOS) 18, covariance-based maximum likelihood method was adopted to 
estimate all models. As recommended by Bollen and Long (1993), a variety of global fit 
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indices was used to evaluate the goodness of fit of the model to the data, including a number 
of absolute and comparative fit indices. These include the traditional overall chi-square test of 
model fit, the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom, also known as the normed chi-square, 
the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), 
incremental fit index (IFI) and the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR). The chi-
square test should be statistically non-significant (Bollen, 1989). The ratio of chi-square to 
degrees of freedom, however, is less straightforward. There is no consensus on what 
constitutes a "good" fit, with figures ranging from 3 to 2 or less (Carmines & McIver, 1983), 
to as high as 5 (Bollen, 2002). This latter threshold of 5 was adopted as the benchmark for an 
acceptable fit in this study. The RMSEA should be under .05, as suggested by Byrne (2001) 
even though levels up to .08  are also acceptable to some researchers (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
The IFI and CFI should be above the recommended .90 value (Hoyle, 1995). The suggested 
benchmark for SRMR was .10 (Byrne, 2001).  
In addition, Modification Indices (MIs) were examined. Indices with values greater 
than 10 were reviewed to determine if the additional parameters made substantive sense and 






Previously, the process of data collection and the instruments used were described. 
The criteria for assessing model fit were also explicated. Subsequently, the models were 
independently fitted to the data collected using SEM, which allows for path analytic 
modelling with latent variables.  
 
Deception model 
The model for deception had appearance similarity, homophily, as exogenous 
variables, identifiability, self-presence and self-awareness as mediating variables, and 
deception as the endogenous variable. Except for an item of anonymity (p = .002), items in 
the measurement model displayed significant p values at the .001 level, indicative of the 
construct validity of the model. All the items have factor loadings of at least .70. 
Initial results indicated that the model fit was satisfactory. The chi-square to degrees 
of freedom ratio was 1.68, the IFI was .91, CFI at .91 and SRMR was .07. The RMSEA, 
however, was a little high (.06) and the chi-square statistic was significant for the global 
model (χ2 (317) = 531.99, p < .001).  
To identify possible areas of misfit, the MIs, which represent misspecified error 
covariances, were examined. The items related to a few error parameters with large MI values 
were found to have some overlap in item content. This, together with Bentler and Chou's 
(1987) exhortation that forcing large error terms to be uncorrelated is unsuitable with real 
data suggest that respecification of the initial model was justified.  
The error covariance related to Items SP5 ("While using Second Life, how much did 
you feel as if you were walking when your avatar walked?") and SP2 ("While using Second 
Life, how much did you feel as if you were moving when your avatar moved [e.g., as in 
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flying or dancing]?") was a prominent recommended modification (MI: 23.96, Expected 
Parameter Change [EPC]: .30). Since moving can be considered superordinate to walking, the 
specification of an error covariance is substantiated. There was appreciable improvement in 
model fit upon freeing the path (χ2 (316) = 495.10, RMSEA = .05, IFI = .93 and CFI = .93). 
The difference in chi-square
 values between the two models was significant (Δχ2 (1) = 36.89 , 
p < .001), indicating substantial improvement in model fit. Although the model fit was 
acceptable, modification indices were still large for some error parameters and they were 
further examined for possible areas of misfit. The items associated with the next pair of error 
parameters (MI: 22.00, EPC: .115) that made substantive sense were Items HM6 ("My avatar 
in Second Life has a lot in common with me") and HM7 ("My avatar in Second Life is 
similar to me"), which seemed to be conceptually similar. Following the addition of the error 
covariance, the chi-square difference between the models was significant (Δχ2 (1) = 29.38, p  
< .001), and the global model fit improved (RMSEA = .05, IFI = .94, CFI = .94, SRMR = 
.07), although the chi-square statistic was still significant (χ2 (315) = 465.72). The final set of 
items with related error parameters of high MI (MI: 13.916; EPC: .211) comprised Items SP2 
and SP1 ("When something happens to your avatar's body, to what extent does it feel like it is 
happening to any part of your body?"). Since physical activity constitutes movement of one's 
body, there was some conceptual replication. Again, incorporation of the error covariance 
significantly improved the model fit (Δχ2 (1) = 16.31, p  < .001).  
The final model fit was within the acceptable guidelines. Although the chi-square 
statistic remained significant for the global model (χ2 (314) = 449.41, p < .001), other fit 
indices were acceptable (chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio = 1.43, IFI = .94, CFI = .94, 
RMSEA = .05 and SRMR = .07). It has to be noted that due to its sensitivity to sample size 
and model complexity, the appropriateness of chi-square testing for model fitting is not 
without its critics (e.g., Byrne, 2001). Many researchers (e.g., Byrne, 2001; Hair, Anderson, 
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Tatham, & Black, 1998) have argued that significance of the chi-square test may be 
discounted when a good model fit is indicated by other alternative tests (e.g., CFI, IFI, and 
RMSEA). The final model fit indices are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Model fit indices for deception model 
χ2 449.41 
df 314 






Figure 4 presents the results of model testing for deception. Appearance similarity led 
to increased homophily (β  = .16, p < .05), supporting H1. Homophily was positively 
associated with self-awareness (β  = .38, p < .001), which, in turn, was positively associated 
with self-presence (β  = .34, p < .001). H2 and H3 were supported. Self-presence was 
positively associated with deception (β  = .38, p < .001). This was in the opposite direction of 
the hypothesis. H4 was, therefore, not supported. Self-awareness was also negatively 
associated with deception (β  = -.23, p < .01). Hence, H5 was supported. Avatar homophily 
was positively related to identifiability (β  = .23, p < .01), such that the more homophilous an 
individual is, the stronger the feelings of identifiability. H6 was supported. Identifiability was 
negatively related to deception (β  = -.31, p < .001), thus supporting H7. All paths in the 
measurement model were significant at the .001, .01 or .05 level. 
In short, the findings showed that 1) appearance similarity increased homophily, 2) 
homophily resulted in heightened self-awareness which reduced deception, 3) self-awareness 
also increased self-presence, resulting in increased deception, and 4) homophily increased 


















Figure 4. Results of SEM analysis for deception model. 
 
Secondary analysis 
Even though it was not initially postulated, the effect of appearance similarity on 
identifiability and self-awareness was tested. Results indicate non-significant effects for both 
paths (β  = .13, p > .05; β  = .01, p > .05). Without mediators, the effect of homophily on 
deception was significant (β = -.22, p < .01). 
A mediation analysis was conducted using AMOS to determine the effect of the 
intervening variables. As AMOS does not compute indirect effects for each mediator, 
comparisons were made using (total) indirect effects. In some cases, only that part of the 
model containing the specific effect was isolated for analysis, hence the results do not take 
into account the simultaneous effect of other mediators. The results of the mediation analysis 
should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.  
Note: All parameter estimates are standardised. 



















Scholars have recommended the use of bootstrapping techniques to examine the 
significance of indirect effects (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Bias-corrected bootstrap was the 
favoured re-sampling method to obtain confidence limits as it made fewer assumptions about 
the distribution of the indirect effect compared to traditional methods, such as the Sobel test 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004). Following these recommendations, 5,000 
bootstrap samples and a bias-corrected confidence interval of 95% were computed. 
Coefficients reported are unstandardised. 
The effect of identifiability as a mediator was first tested. The indirect effect of 
homophily on deception through identifiability (IE = -.07, CI = -.17, -.02) was significant 
while the direct effect (DE = -.15, CI = -.40, .09) was not, suggesting that identifiability could 
be a full mediator in the homophily-deception relationship 
Next, the effect of self-awareness and self-presence as mediators of homophily and 
deception was examined. The indirect effect of homophily on deception through self-
awareness and self-presence (IE = .04, CI = .02, .10) was significant. The direct effect of 
homophily on deception was also significant (DE = -.25, CI = -.49, -.05), indicating that self-
awareness and self-presence are partial mediators of the relationship between homophily and 
deception.  
To further investigate the effect of self-presence on the self-awareness-deception 
relationship, that part of the model was singled out for analysis. The indirect effect was 
significant (IE = .15, CI = .07, .33), as was the direct effect (DE = -.31, CI = -.61, -.12). 
When self-presence was not included, the relationship between self-awareness and deception 
was reduced and non-significant (DE = -.07, CI = -.29, .11). Thus, self-presence could have a 
suppressor effect on the relationship between self-awareness and deception.  
On the whole, the total indirect effect was significant (IE = -.08, CI = -.19, -.01), 
indicating that the multiple mediators exert an influence on deception. The direct effect of 
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homophily on deception in the model was non-significant (DE = -.12, CI = -.35, .09). Given 
that the indirect paths from homophily to identifiability to deception, and from homophily to 
self-awareness to deception were negative while the indirect path of homophily to deception 
via self-awareness and self-presence was positive, these opposing mediational processes 
could produce an overall relation between homophily and deception that is non-significant, in 
what MacKinnon, Fairchild and Fritz (2007) termed as inconsistent mediation. 
 
Self-disclosure model 
The model had appearance similarity and homophily as exogenous variables, 
identifiability, self-awareness and self-presence as mediating variables and self-disclosure as 
the endogenous variable. All items in the latent factors exhibited factor loadings above .70. 
All items had significant p values at the .001 level, thus affirming the construct validity of the 
measurement model.  
Initial examination of the model indicated that the model fit was not adequate, with 
significant chi-square statistic (χ2 (398) = 719.70, p < .001). The other goodness-of-fit indices 
were not ideal as well although some of the indices (e.g., IFI and CFI) were approaching the 
significant threshold. The chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio was at 1.81, the IFI was .89, 
CFI at .89, RMSEA at .06 and SRMR was .07.  
Inspection of the MIs indicated some large values for the error parameters. The paths 
associated with large MIs were largely the same as those in the deception model. A 
recommended modification for error covariance related to Items SP2 and SP5. The MI was 
rather large and the expected parameter change was pronounced (MI: 24.31, EPC: .31). The 
addition of a path improved the model fit (χ2 (397) = 683.01, χ2/df = 1.72, RMSEA = .06, IFI 
= .91, CFI = .90, SRMR = .07). The difference in χ2 values between the two models (Δχ2 (1) 
= 36.69) was significant at the .001 level, an indication of a discernibly better model fit. The 
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next pair of error parameters with considerable MIs related to Items SP2 and SP1 (MI: 12.74, 
EPC: .20). The path was freed, which revealed a statistically significant improvement in 
model fit (Δχ2 (1) = 15.22, p  < .001). With the exception of the RMSEA (.06) and 
significance of the chi-square statistic (χ2 (396) = 667.80, p < .001), other fit indices for the 
model were within the acceptable thresholds (χ2/df = 1.69, IFI = .91, CFI = .91, SRMR = 
.07). The items associated with the final pair of error parameters that made substantive sense 
were Items HM6 and HM7 (MI = 21.73, EPC = .11). 
Upon freeing the parameter, the fit of the final model improved considerably (Δχ2 (1) 
= 29.10, p < .001). Results of the analysis indicated that the fit indices were generally within 
acceptable thresholds of goodness of fit although the chi-square statistic remained significant 
(χ2 (395) = 638.70, p < .001). The RMSEA was .05,  IFI at .92 and CFI at .92. The ratio of 
chi-square to degrees of freedom was 1.62 and the SRMR was .07. Table 2 shows the model 
fit indices. 
 
Table 2: Model fit indices for self-disclosure model 
χ2 638.70 
df 395 






All paths in the measurement model were significant at the .001 or .05 level (see 
Figure 5). Appearance similarity predicted homophily (β  = .17, p < .05), so H1 was 
supported. Homophily was positively associated with self-awareness (β  = .38, p < .001) as 
well as identifiability (β  = .22, p < .05), supporting H2 and H6. Heightened self-awareness 
did not lead to higher self-disclosure (β  = .12, p > .05) so H8 was not supported. Heightened 
self-awareness did, however, increase self-presence (β  = .35, p < .001), which led to higher 
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self-disclosure (β  = .37, p < .001). Both H3 and H9 were therefore supported. Identifiability 
led to lower self-disclosure (β  = -.17, p < .05). Hence, H10 was supported. Figure 5 shows 
the self-disclosure model. 
To summarise, the results showed that 1) greater appearance similarity correlated with 
increased homophily, 2) increased homophily heightened self-awareness, which did not 
significantly impact self-disclosure, 3) self-awareness elevated self-presence, which increased 




















A secondary analysis was conducted to ascertain the mediating effect of 
identifiability, self-awareness and self-presence on the relationship between homophily and 
self-disclosure. The effect of identifiability as a mediator was first tested. The indirect effect 
of homophily on self-disclosure through identifiability was significant (IE = -.06, CI = -.17, -
Note: All parameter estimates are standardised. 




















.01). The direct effect was also significant (DE= .21, CI = .001, .43). As the direct and 
indirect effects are opposite in sign, and the direct effect of homophily on self-disclosure was 
reduced (DE = .15, CI = -.06, .36) when identifiability was not included as mediator, this 
suggests that identifiability could be a suppressor variable. 
The effect of self-awareness and self-presence as mediators of homophily and self-
disclosure was next examined. While the indirect effect of homophily on self-disclosure via 
self-awareness and self-presence was significant (IE = .07, CI = .03, .15), the direct effect 
was not (DE = .11, CI = -.06, .29). This suggests that self-awareness and self-presence 
function as indirect mediators (i.e., a mediator of indirect-only effects, with no direct effect; 
Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010) of the homophily-self-disclosure relationship. Even though 
Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that there first has to be an effect to be mediated, recent 
scholars (e.g., MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002; Zhao, et al., 
2010) have argued that this may not be necessary.  
To better understand the role of self-presence in the relationship between self-
awareness and self-disclosure, that part of the model was further analysed. Self-awareness 
had a significant indirect effect on self-disclosure via self-presence (IE = .19, CI = .09, .37) 
but the direct effect was not significant (DE = .11, CI = -.13, .36). However, as the link 
between self-awareness and self-disclosure was significant when self-presence was removed 
(DE = .27, CI = .03, .59), this suggests that self-presence fully mediated the effect of self-
awareness on self-disclosure.  
To determine if removal of the non-significant direct path between self-awareness and 
self-disclosure would improve the model, a chi-square difference test was conducted. The test 
showed that the two models were not significantly different (Δχ2 (1) = 1.93, p > .05). Hence, 
the original research model with the non-significant path between self-awareness and self-
disclosure was retained. 
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Taken as a whole, the direct effect of homophily on self-disclosure (DE = .13, CI = -
.07, .34) and the total indirect effect (IE = .04, CI = -.07, .18) were non-significant. The 
mediational processes were opposing, as with the deception model: The effect of homophily 
on self-disclosure via self-awareness and self-presence was positive while the effect of 
homophily on self-disclosure via identifiability was negative. Thus, again there could be 
inconsistent mediation where due to the opposing effects, the overall relation between 
homophily and self-disclosure may be negligible.  
 
Continuance intention model 
In this model, appearance similarity and homophily were the exogenous variables, 
self-awareness and immersion were the mediating variables while continuance intention was 
the endogenous variable. As six respondents did not answer the questions on continuance 
intention, the sample size for this model was 203. Except for one item of homophily (.69), all 
items in the latent factors exhibited factor loadings above .70. The item was retained as it was 
close to the .70 cutoff. All, excepting one item of continuance intention (.02), had significant 
p values at the .001 level, thus affirming the construct validity of the measurement model.  
The initial model had a satisfactory fit. The chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio 
was 1.66 and SRMR was .07. The IFI and CFI, both at .93, indicate a satisfactory fit even 
though the RMSEA, at .06, was above the recommended value. Although the chi-square 
statistic was significant (χ2 (205) = 340.71, p < .001), as mentioned, its importance can be 
downplayed if other goodness-of-fit indices were satisfactory. 
Inspection of the MIs indicated that as with the other two models, the MI related to 
items of error parameters HM6 and HM7 was relatively high (MI: 21.92, EPC: .11). Upon 
incorporation of the error covariance, goodness-of-fit indices revealed a statistically 
significant improvement in model fit (Δχ2 (1) = 29.81, p < .001), with increases in both IFI 
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and CFI (from .93 to .95). The chi-square statistic was χ2 (204) = 310.90 (p < .001). RMSEA 
dropped from .06 to .05 and the chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio dipped to 1.52 from 
1.66. There was no change in the SRMR (.07). Another pair of error parameters (MI: 10.47, 
EPC: .16) that could be freed were IM4 ("While using Second Life, to what extent were there 
times when the virtual world became the 'reality' for you, and you almost forgot about the 
'real world' where you physically are?") and IM5 ("While using Second Life, to what extent 
did you feel immersed in the virtual environment?"), which are conceptually related since the 
virtual world becoming one's 'reality' indicates that the user feels submerged or surrounded 
by the virtual environment. 
Freeing the path further improved the model fit. The final model had good fit 
(RMSEA = .05, IFI = .95, CFI = .95, χ2/df = 1.46, SRMR = .07). However, as with the other 
models, the chi-square statistic was significant (χ2 (203) = 296.47, p < .001). 
Table 3 shows the model fit indices for the improved model. 
 
Table 3: Model fit indices for continuance intention model 
χ2 296.47 
df 203 






In the measurement model, appearance similarity was positively associated with 
homophily (β  = .17, p < .05), supporting H1. Homophily predicted self-awareness (β  = .38, 
p < .001), which led to greater immersion (β  = .35, p < .001), hence H2 and H11 were 
supported. Immersion was positively associated with continuance intention (β  = .33, p < 
.001). Hence, H12 was supported. All paths in the measurement model were significant at the 
.001 or .05 level. 
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In summary, the results showed that 1) avatar similarity increased homophily, 2) 
increased homophily heightened self-awareness, 3) self-awareness produced stronger feelings 




A secondary analysis was carried out to study the mediating roles of self-awareness 
and immersion. In the absence of mediators, homophily had a significant direct effect on 
continuance intention (DE = .24, CI = .05, .48). 
  With the inclusion of self-awareness and immersion the indirect effect of homophily 
on continuance intention was significant (IE = .04, CI = .01, .13) as was the direct effect of 
homophily on continuance intention (DE = .21, CI = .02, .43). This suggests that self-
awareness and immersion are partial mediators of the homophily-continuance relationship. 
Since the direct effect of homophily on continuance intention was significant, a test 
was conducted to determine if the addition of a path between homophily and continuance 
intention would be a better alternative model. Model fit indices indicated a link between 
homophily and continuance intention further improved the fit (χ2 (202) = 290.58, IFI = .96, 
CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06) and a chi-square difference test showed that the 
difference was significant (Δχ2 (1) = 5.90, p < .05). A path from homophily to continuance 
intention was therefore added to the final model. The final model fit indices and final 
measurement model are shown in Table 4 and Figure 6.  
 
Table 4: Model fit indices for revised continuance intention model 
χ2 290.58 
df 202 






























Since deception and self-disclosure are conceptually related and continuance intention 
could be an outcome related to reduced deception or increased self-disclosure, they can 
arguably be combined in a single model and analysed. In this model, self-presence instead of 
immersion was linked with continuance intention. Self-presence and immersion have 
different conceptualisations in this study but both relate to perceptions in the virtual 
environment. It is possible that people who experience their avatars as their real selves would 
find the virtual experience more enjoyable and would therefore be likely to use the virtual 
environment again. 
Note: All parameter estimates are standardised. 
















Table 5 shows the fit indices and Figure 7 shows the combined model. Although the 
fit indices were still within the benchmark set (e.g., CFI and IFI > .90, and RMSEA = .05), 
the model was of slightly less good fit compared to the three separate models of deception, 
self-disclosure and continuance intention, possibly due, in part, to the more complex model. 
The relationship between deception and continuance intention was significant but in a 
negative direction. The relationship between self-disclosure and continuance intention was, 
however, non-significant. This suggests that even though an avatar that encourages less 
deceptive behaviour might boost intentions to continue use of a medium, self-disclosure 
might not. As the combined model also makes interpretation of the results difficult, the three 
separate models are preferred over the combined model even though it is more parsimonious.  
 
Table 5: Model fit indices for combined model 
χ2 974.449 
df 646 






























Figure 7. Results of SEM analysis for combined model. 
Note: All parameter estimates are standardised. 






























Having examined the results of SEM analysis on three models, the findings are 
reviewed with separate discussions of the three models. The significant findings of each 
model are discussed and this is followed by a general discussion of the findings and its 
theoretical contributions.  
 
Deception model 
The aim of the deception model was to unveil underlying mechanisms in the 
relationship between avatar-self similarity and deception. The findings indicate that 
depending on the mediating factors, avatar similarity can either increase or decrease 
deception. Perceived avatar appearance similarity increased social projection as Ames' 
(2004a, 2004b) similarity contingency model predicted. This, in turn, augmented feelings of 
homophily as people project their own attributes to their self-similar avatars. Perceived 
similarity of values, beliefs and attitudes with avatar increased feelings of identifiability, 
which can reduce deception. With homophily, the user is made aware of the inner self, 
leading to high self-awareness. In line with prior research (Batson, et al., 1999; Froming, et 
al., 1982), self-awareness led to lower levels of deception.  
Self-awareness led to high self-presence as well since the greater awareness of bodily 
experiences (Scheier, et al., 1979) predisposes individuals to more acutely perceive virtual 
stimuli from the synthetic environment thereby increasing self-presence. It was postulated 
that people who feel that the virtual self is the actual self would deceive less since they might 
perceive less discrepancy between the two. However, contrary to expectations, self-presence 
did not decrease deception but instead increased it. It is surmised that when one observes the 
virtual self on screen, one might become conscious of the self as an object of observation of 
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others. In virtual worlds and MMORPGs, what is seen of the avatar is usually an above the 
head back view or a full body view, making the user an observer of the avatar. With the 
perception that the self is the avatar, the user may recognise that the self is being observed by 
others just as the user now observes him- or herself. This could increase public self-
awareness and make salient self-presentation concerns, resulting in deception. 
Notably, results of the mediation analysis revealed the role of self-awareness and self-
presence as partial mediators in the relationship between homophily and deception. The 
direct effect of homophily on deception was non-significant in the absence of mediators of 
self-awareness and self-presence. With the addition of self-awareness, the direct and indirect 
effects of homophily on deception were also non-significant. It was only with the inclusion of 
self-presence that both the direct and indirect effects of homophily on deception via self-
awareness became significant. At the same time, self-presence was found to have a 
suppressor effect on the relationship between self-awareness and deception, such that with 
the inclusion of self-presence, the direct effect of self-awareness on deception became 
significant, in line with previous research, which has shown an association between self-
awareness and deception (Batson, et al., 1999; Carver, 1974; Froming, et al., 1982).  
The intervening variables of identifiability, self-awareness and self-presence fully 
mediated the relationship between avatar similarity and deception. This is an important and 
useful finding as it suggests that these factors completely explain the process through which 
avatar similarity affects deception. 
The results demonstrate that users with self-similar avatars show lower levels of 
duplicity than those with dissimilar avatars. Thus, user preferences in choice of avatars 
subsequently affected behaviour while using the avatar. In addition, this study identifies the 
suppressor effect of self-presence in the relation between self-awareness and deception. This 
is a useful contribution as suppressors improve the prediction of the independent variable. In 
97 
 
this case, self-presence suppresses irrelevant variance in self-awareness, indirectly allowing 
for a more concise estimate of the self-awareness-deception relationship. Overall, this study 
contributes to a better understanding of the processes and mediators involved when avatar-
self similarity affects deception, and in doing so, extends previous research. 
 
Deception and contexts 
Deception, in particular, is a thorny issue to tackle as it is often spontaneous and may 
be context-dependent. It might be argued that whether people deceive hinge, in part, on the 
context in which the interaction takes place. For example, there might not be an expectation 
of honesty when people are role-playing. Other factors, like a playful personality, or the 
threatening appearance or behaviour of a stranger might also affect deception. Playfulness is 
often related with non-serious, non-conscientious or hedonistically oriented attributes 
(Proyer, 2012) and some individuals might lie just for the fun of it. To explore these possible 
explanations for deception, an interview was conducted with 11 respondents of the survey.  
 
Role-play as story-telling or acting 
Role-play involves the adoption of a character and collaborative creation of stories, 
and these are often not true to real life. Hence, role-players may not be expected to 
communicate truthful information about themselves. However, role-players point out that 
although role-play involves fictional elements, it is different from the act of deliberate lies, 
and one of the interviewees PT (female, role-player of a sci-fi simulation) spoke of it as 
story-telling:   
... there's a difference between telling a lie to tell an untruth about 
something real and making up a fictional story. If you're telling an 
untruth, you're presenting something that is not the truth as the real 
truth. With telling a fictional story, there is the shared 




In the same vein, others, like  RM, a female who role-plays as a vampire in Second 
Life, see it as acting.  
Well playing a vampire is in fact a lie. I am not one. Well at least last 
time i checked i didnt explode in sunlight. If you consider acting 
lying then yes it is lying... We are making our own play just without 
a script. 
 
In role-play simulations, there are expectations that visitors would adhere to rules, 
which may or may not be explicit, not to disturb or interrupt the role-play. The rules may be 
distributed in the form of notecards given out at landing points although not all simulations 
have this. Tags may be issued for visitors so role-players know to exclude them in their role-
play. The role-play itself may also clue visitors that the players are not engaging in day-to-
day conversations. There are, therefore, rather obvious information or cues that signal to 
visitors that they are not in a normal simulation. Thus, role-players, like PT, see little excuse 
for visitors claiming not to know where they are. 
Actually, most RPG [role-play game] sims, if you've made it into the 
game area proper, you would have had to have passed through the 
visitor's welcome area, read the sim rules etc. Unless they had been a 
bit of a knobhead and just barged in, they would be at least *aware* 
they were entering a story telling game area.  
 
If a visitor does interrupt the role-play with questions, role-players say they may reply 
as their character while at the same time, they send a private message to the visitor or talk to 
the visitor out-of-character (OOC). It is also possible that the visitor be told off, ignored or 
even evicted from the simulation as such intrusions destroy the role-players' sense of 
immersion. To preserve this sense of immersion, role-players may not want to chat out-of-
character and possibly, in such situations, visitors who are not aware of the ongoing role-play 
may be misled. While a few role-players feel that this might be deceptive since it is character 
information that is revealed when personal information is sought, many others, like SD, a 
female who role-plays an elf, do not see it as such.  
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No, i'd just think they were getting very immersed in their character, 
but i can see how it might come across that way to an outsider... to 
me, it would be like an actor in a play.. the person that's staying IC 
[in-character] is keeping their experience going, and including the 
visitor in the experience.. i don't always agree with that, but it does 
give a visitor the opportunity to meet some of the characters (as 
opposed to the avatars OOC), and to see what the RP can be like. 
 
For self-professed long-time role-player, SW, a female who role-plays mainly as a 
shape-shifter, remaining in-character is the prerogative of the role-player as they are in a role-
play simulation: "I wouldn't say they are lying, if the other feels they should chat with the 
visitor as their character then by al means they could". For others, the setting in which the 
interaction takes place contextualises it as role-play. SC (female, in 30s) cited being "in 'play 
mode'" as giving latitude to what role-play entails. By travelling to a role-play simulation, 
there is also an assumption that the visitor should know what to expect, as MT, a female role-
player of a simulation based on an alternate-world setting, said "he is on a sim for rp, he 
should rp or leave". 
 
Deception in play 
Virtual environments, computer games and other digital technologies facilitate the 
construction of playful identities (Raessens, 2006), with people being more playful online 
than offline. This playfulness may result in the making of deceptive or exaggerated 
statements in order to have some fun. Many respondents claimed that they would not lie just 
for fun. However, respondents, like SW, who admitted to using deception to have fun, 
emphasised that she would eventually confess that it was a joke and whatever she said was 
not to be taken seriously.  
...I do joke around with people saying untrue stuff and they do 
know. I mean if they don't I let them know "hey, I am only saying 




Another strategy SD spoke of was to make the deception or exaggeration obvious so 
that others would understand it to be a joke. 
Most of the time, if I do, i make it blatantly obvious that I'm lying. 
There has probably been one or two times where i've done it on a 
more serious level, but nothing I can remember 
 
When probed to explain what "a more serious level" means, SD elaborated thus: 
If I'm being untruthful, and not making it obvious.. basically lying 
about something, to get a laugh, does that make sense? Even in those 
cases, I'd keep it fairly small.. nothing that would offend anyone.. but 
might hide something I'm embarrassed about. 
 
Deception employed for such light-hearted moments is generally reserved for friends. 
Some even claimed that they would behave in a serious manner towards strangers, suggesting 
that deception due to playfulness might be more relevant to friends than strangers.  
 
Appearance and deception 
Virtual appearance has been found to be important in influencing others' perceptions 
of the user (Nowak & Rauh, 2008). However, all the respondents said that appearances would 
not affect whether they would be truthful to an avatar. Hence, whether an avatar looks 
threatening or freaky would not affect the veracity of the interaction. What it could affect 
though was the willingness to interact with such an avatar. SD, for instance, spoke of  a 
possible difference in character with the avatar: "sometimes it's just a case of not feeling like 
i'd get on with them, that our personalities are too mis-matched". Others would walk or 
teleport away, mute or even expel the said avatar if it were on their land. Some, like LF, 
(male, in 40s) talked about ignoring such avatars and put it down to the lack of commonality 
with them.  
Just ignore  it & go on with my business. i have no interest in 
chating with a child avatar or demon avatar for most cases ... have 




Behaviour, on the other hand, was cited by PT to influence honesty in her 
interactions. If an avatar behaves in a boorish manner, not only would she adopt some of the 
strategies others mentioned, e.g., mute or ignore, she might also not be honest with it.  
It really depends on how the person acts. Basically, if the person 
with a scary AV is being a douchebag, I am far less likely to be 
truthful with that person. In fact I am far more likely to TP [teleport] 
elsewhere, ignore or mute them, or if I have to, report them. But if 
they happen to be a nice person who just is wearing a scary av, I'll 
still be nice to them. Often we have a bit of a conversation about the 
spooky av. 
 
Also cited to be a cause for duplicity was affiliations with dubious simulations as it 
paints a certain image of the personality behind the avatar. This undesirable image 
encourages individuals like PT to be untruthful because they are not interested to socialise 
with an uncouth character.  
More their behaviour, or what they put on their profile (if I look at it), 
or sometimes what their group tag is will make me less likely to tell 
the truth. Sometimes I will recognise the group tag of a sim that is 
into something skeezy, so that will make me go 'errr, what kind of 
person will want to advertise they belong to that sim?'. 
 
 
The interviews seem to suggest that external factors, like avatar appearance, and 
personality dispositions, such as playfulness, largely do not affect deception. Even in role-
play contexts, where role-players create a character and devise a development plot, these 
were not considered deceptive acts as the setting and the activity legitimise the fabrication of 
stories and backgrounds. Several respondents spoke of not revealing personal information to 
strangers and choosing to express their discomfort with the question to the interlocutor 
instead of lying. The low rate of deception as shown by the survey results (M = 4.36) also 





The self-disclosure model was proposed to explain the processes that underlie the 
relationship between avatar-self similarity and self-disclosure. The findings revealed that 
avatar similarity can have either a positive or negative impact on self-disclosure depending 
on how its effects are mediated by different factors. Similarity in avatar appearance increases 
homophily. Homophily has a positive effect on self-disclosure when its effects are mediated 
by self-awareness and self-presence. Consistent with previous research, self-awareness makes 
one more aware of internal states and perceptions (Pryor, et al., 1977), which can result in 
feelings of self-presence. Traversing the virtual environment in a self-similar avatar could 
heighten feelings of familiarity and security, leading people to be more self-disclosing 
(Bauminger, et al., 2008; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
On the other hand, avatar similarity has a negative impact on self-disclosure by 
increasing feelings of identifiability. The perception of attribute similarity might make the 
sense of identifiability stronger. Instinctively, people who feel that way will withdraw from 
self-disclosure, suggesting a move to limit information and maintain privacy. These results 
are congruous with previous work on the effects of identifiability and anonymity (e.g., Booth-
Kewley, et al., 1992; Derlega & Chaikin, 1977). 
However, not all the hypotheses were supported. A direct impact of self-awareness on 
self-disclosure was expected. Instead, self-awareness worked through self-presence to 
influence self-disclosure. Previous research has indicated an association between self-
awareness and self-disclosure (Davis & Franzoi, 1986; Franzoi, et al., 1985; Joinson, 2001b). 
While the link between self-awareness and self-disclosure was significant when self-
awareness mediated the relationship between homophily and self-disclosure, the relationship 
was no longer significant with the inclusion of self-presence, which fully mediated the 
relationship between self-awareness and self-disclosure.  
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The direct effect between homophily and self-disclosure was non-significant. As 
noted earlier, homophily can have either a positive or negative effect on self-disclosure. Thus, 
the oppositely valenced effects could have nullify each other. However, this finding was 
established only by exploring potential mediators. By specifying the mediators and 
establishing how and when they are operational in the relationship between avatar similarity 
and self-disclosure, this study makes a valuable contribution. 
It might be argued that the propensity to self-disclose could influence the choice of 
avatars, with high self-disclosers more likely to choose self-similar avatars. Using a measure 
of self-disclosure competence (Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988), the 
proclivity to self-disclose was added as a control variable in the model. Results show that the 
structural relationships did not change when self-disclosure propensity was included. The 
path coefficients were the same as those of the research model although the model fit 
decreased (χ2(654) = 1081.45, IFI = .89, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .084).   
 
Continuance intention model 
The continuance intention model was proposed to unveil the mechanism by which 
avatar similarity affects intention to continue use of a medium. The results supported the 
predictions of appearance similarity effects on homophily and self-awareness. Self-awareness 
theory predicted that self-aware individuals would have greater access to their internal 
experience and responsivity to affect (Scheier & Carver, 1977). Thus, the user would be more 
attuned to his or her perceptions, as well as the arousal of the virtual environment, 
predisposing the self to experience immersion. Feelings of immersion can mean a more vivid 
and engaging user experience, it can, therefore, lead to the intention to continue use of the 
virtual environment. Taken together, the results illustrate the process through which 
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continuance intention can be affected by appearance similarity through the influence of self-
awareness. 
The significance of self-awareness as a mediator in the relationship between avatar 
similarity and immersion is a notable contribution of this study. Although some studies have 
indicated that avatars should be related to immersion (e.g., Slater & Usoh, 1994; Taylor, 
2003), empirical evidence on the relationship has been scant, with no clear indications as to 
whether there should be a direct or indirect association between the two. This study provides 
the empirical evidence for the relationship and demonstrates the importance of self-awareness 
as a mediator in this relationship. Without self-awareness, the association of homophily with 
immersion was non-significant (β = .114, p > .05).  
 
General discussion 
This research examined the role of self-awareness in the relationship between avatar 
similarity and behavioural outcomes of deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. 
Focusing on self-awareness as a mediator, together with other mediators of self-presence, 
immersion and identifiability, avatar-self similarity was found to relate to outcomes of 
deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. The mechanisms underlying the 
relationships were also revealed. 
Overall, the study supported the proposition that deception, self-disclosure and 
intention are affected by avatar similarity via self-awareness. Through self-awareness, avatar 
similarity influenced self-disclosure, and impacted other factors, such as self-presence and 
immersion, to affect deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. This demonstrates 
the significance of self-awareness as a central factor which links the three models. 
Importantly, it was shown that working through self-awareness, avatar similarity influenced 
the theoretical concept of self-presence to bring about different consequences in behaviour. In 
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all, this study extended research of avatar effects by identifying the factors involved in the 
process and articulating the paths they took to effect the behavioural and attitudinal change.  
Self-presence has been found to increase self-disclosure as well as deception. At first 
glance, this may seem contradictory. However, it should be noted that although self-
disclosure is conceptualised as a uni-dimensional concept in this study as have some 
researchers (e.g., Miller, et al., 1983), other researchers (e.g., Leung, 2002; Wheeless & 
Grotz, 1976) have viewed it as multi-dimensional, comprising aspects such as depth, 
accuracy, amount, valence and intentionality. Thus, accuracy, which corresponds to 
deception, might be low even when other dimensions are high. Future research could 
examine self-disclosure more finely to validate the findings in this study. 
Since gender and age may influence tendency to create self similar avatars, the 
relationship of these basic demographic information with appearance similarity and 
homophily was assessed. Except for the relationship between age and appearance similarity 
which was weakly correlated and marginally significant (r = .14, p =.06), all the other 
relationships were non-significant. 
The findings have implications for developers of virtual environments. Interface 
designers might benefit from an informed understanding, not only of how a certain factor 
would bring about a particular psychological state or behaviour, but also the transitions 
between those states and the interplay of relations. An improved understanding of the 
mediating relationships in online behaviour and attitude, such as deception, self-disclosure 
and continuance intention, could allow them to be targeted for specific outcomes. This might 
afford developers more avenues to engineer specific user behaviour through the design of 
avatars and incorporate it as part of the architectural system. A veridical and supportive 
environment might encourage continued use, and could be advantageous in retaining users 
and contribution to profits.  
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These design considerations could be applied to other avatar-driven virtual 
environments and applications. For example, in environments where customisation is 
relatively limited, if there are other drivers of homophily or if users perceive that the avatar is 
homophilous, deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention might still be influenced 
through self-awareness, self-presence, identifiability and immersion since it is homophily that 
is driving the effects. 
 
Theoretical contributions 
One of the important contributions of the study is in demonstrating the distinctive role 
of self-presence, which can help in theory-building. Compared to physical presence and 
social presence, the concept of self-presence is relatively under-researched. There is limited 
theoretical discussion about the construct and empirical research in this area is relatively 
scarce. Yet, the concept is of real relevance to avatars and relation of the self in avatar-driven 
environments, such as MMORPGs, virtual worlds and even console games. Self-presence 
was a suppressor variable in the deception model and a mediating variable in the self-
disclosure model. In the deception model, it played a pivotal role in drawing out the avatar-
deception relationship, which hitherto was not known. In the self-disclosure model, it fully 
mediated the relationship between self-awareness and self-disclosure. These are novel and 
exciting findings as research on self-disclosure in offline settings have largely postulated a 
direct link between self-awareness and deception (Batson, et al., 1999; Carver, 1974; 
Froming, et al., 1982), and self-awareness and self-disclosure (Davis & Franzoi, 1986; 
Franzoi, et al., 1985; Joinson, 2001b). The findings signal that the relationship might be 
different in online settings and that it may be necessary to consider the role of self-presence 
in avatar-driven environments, given that self-presence is tied to the virtual self. The results 
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suggest that we may have to re-look self-awareness theory and its application in virtual 
environments.  
  Another important contribution of the study is the effect of homophily on 
psychological states. Avatar appearance has generally captured much scholarly attention 
since it is the most evident representation of the digital self. Yet, it seems that homophily also 
plays an important role. Avatar similarity is often seen as a uni-dimensional concept of 
physical similarity, or if the dimension of homophily is included, it is often conflated with 
appearance. However, this study showed that important relationships can be obscured if 
homophily and appearance are not separately examined. It was found that homophily had a 
stronger effect than appearance similarity on all the mediating psychological variables. Only 
with the independent investigation of the two dimensions were the effects of each on different 
mediators discerned. In the models of deception and self-disclosure, identifiability, which is 
more often associated with appearance similarity, was found to be linked with homophily. 
Similarly, in all three models, it was homophily that had an effect on self-awareness. This 
effect would not have been revealed had avatar similarity been examined as a single 
dimension using only appearance similarity. This has implications for future researchers as it 
means they need to consider both dimensions of appearance and homophily when examining 
avatar similarity. They could be missing out on important relationships if they focused on one 
or conflate the two. 
Further, the inclusion of constructs of self-awareness, self-presence, immersion and 
identifiability showed that there is a relationship between avatar similarity and behaviours, 
and attitude but it is effectuated through mediators. Self-presence and identifiability were 
identified to be suppressor variables in the self-awareness-deception and homophily-self-
disclosure relationships. This has theoretical implications for future studies as including the 
suppressors in these relationships can increase the predictive power of the predictor so that it 
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becomes a more efficient predictor of the criterion through removal of the criterion-irrelevant 
variance. Together, self-awareness, self-presence and identifiability in the deception model 
fully mediated the effect of avatar similarity on deception. In the models of self-disclosure 
and continuance intention, self-awareness, self-presence and immersion were indirect or 
partial mediators. These are novel findings which identify the intervening variables and their 
effects. It is a valuable contribution of this study that through the exploration of mediators, 
the effect of avatar similarity on deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention can be 
explained more fully. It also shows the value of investigating mechanisms underlying 
relationships as this unveils the complexity of effects and the way they influence different 
factors. That self-awareness inevitably affects self-presence to influence deception and self-
disclosure again suggests the importance of self-presence in avatar-driven environments. 
More research would need to be conducted to ascertain its role. 
The present research provides empirical evidence of the utility of the three models of 
deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention. The models can be applied to other 
avatar-driven environments, such as MMORPGs, virtual worlds and console games. They 
also provide a useful framework upon which future work can be based to further expand our 





In the current work, the aim was to explore how self-similar avatars can change user 
behaviours. In particular, it was hypothesised that self-similar avatars would increase 
identifiability and private self-awareness, which would, in turn, affect self-disclosure and 
deception. Through its effect on self-presence and immersion, self-awareness was also 
expected to influence self-disclosure, deception and continuance intention.  
The results showed that similarity in avatar appearance promotes feelings that the 
avatar is similar to the self in terms of attitudes, thoughts and behaviour. Such homophilous 
feelings heighten self-awareness, which has a number of effects. First, it has a direct effect on 
deception. As attention directed at the private aspects of the self brings into focus the 
discrepancy between personal standards and behaviour, deception is reduced. Second, self-
awareness strengthens the perception that the virtual self is the actual self. This perception 
can increase deception as well as self-disclosure. Finally, self-awareness can elevate feelings 
that the user is enveloped by the virtual world. Such perceptions of immersion can bolster the 
intention for continued use of the virtual environment. Additionally, homophily leads 
individuals to feel that they are identifiable. This can reduce deception and lead to low self-
disclosure.  
The findings are significant and novel as previously little research has examined the 
link self-similar avatars have with deception and self-disclosure. Through the surfacing of 
underlying mechanisms, we are made aware of the unique role of self-presence in mediating 
the relationship of avatars with deception and self-disclosure in this study. The findings could 
potentially help to extend theory and call for a closer examination of the role of self-presence 
in self-awareness theory, particularly in the context of virtual environments. 
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Utilising a refined operationalisation of the notion of avatar similarity, both physical 
appearance and homophily were included in the analyses. The results illustrated the 
importance of this inclusion as the often neglected aspect of homophily was found to have a 
stronger effect on both self-awareness and identifiability than appearance similarity.  
By surfacing pertinent relationships between avatars and important outcomes of 
deception, self-disclosure and continuance intention, the study unveiled the underlying 
mechanisms that bridge them, thereby contributing to better knowledge about the effects of 
self-similar avatars. Further, it can augment understanding of the mediating variables in the 
relationship, as well as prompt a better appreciation of the role of self-awareness.  
In addition to the theoretical contributions, the research can be applied in some 
functional ways to help improve the virtual environment, in terms of reducing deception and 
fostering closer ties. 
 
Practical applications 
For practitioners, the findings have some practical applications as they can be used to 
advise users on their choice of avatars so as to encourage the desired kind of attitude or 
behaviour. Developers can also benefit from an informed understanding of the complex 
interplay of relationship as a factor does not only affect a specific behaviour but may also 
have attendant effects. They need to be conscious that factors that are propitious may also 
have unexpected corollary effects. For instance, although feelings of self-presence can 
increase enjoyment and flow (Bailey, et al., 2009; Jin, 2011), which is desirable for game 
play, it can also result in greater deception as this study shows.  
In terms of deception, avatar homophily has been found to have a negative effect on 
deception when the relationship is mediated by variables of identifiability and self-awareness. 
At the same time, self-awareness can also lead to self-presence, which affects deception 
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positively. As such, there is a need for careful balance so that deceptive outcomes can be 
avoided.  
To reduce deception, creators of virtual worlds could, for instance, make users feel 
more identifiable through persistent labelling of avatars. This could make them more 
accountable for their actions, which could deter deviant behaviour.  
Even though designers of virtual environments often work to engage as many of the 
users' senses as possible, the outcomes may not always be in the best interest of the 
community. Voice chats, for instance, could increase the sense of public self-awareness, 
making salient self-presentation concerns which can increase deception. Thus, they may not 
be such a good idea, especially in social contexts, since users in such situations are looking to 
build relationships and this goal may be thwarted by deception. 
For self-disclosure, the results indicate that feelings of homophily can either make 
users feel more identifiable or more self-aware, which can alter the levels of self-disclosure. 
Avatar similarity, it seems, is a double-edged sword and people are constantly negotiating 
their levels of disclosure amidst fears of being identified.  
When applied to the field of education, the idea of avatars facilitating self-disclosure 
is especially useful. Institutions with online courses or distance learning classes can make use 
of virtual environments that allow students to customise their avatars. Instead of having 
collaborations and discussions through faceless online text chats, students might be 
encouraged to engage one another more deeply using self-similar avatars. In doing so, they 
might have self-disclosing conversations and develop strong bonds which can provide them 
with greater social support. 
In the context of online therapy, patients who use self-similar avatars might be more 
forthcoming in their disclosure to their therapists, resulting in better support and help. 
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However, there is also a need, especially in such sensitive contexts, to ensure that the patient 
is not identifiable to others so that the patient’s right to confidentiality is protected. 
Consumers visiting e-commerce sites that let them try their products through their 
avatars might experience greater self-presence since they feel that their actual selves are 
involved. As such, they are likely to feel more positive about the site. They might also be 
more willing to disclose information about themselves, giving businesses an opportunity to 
find out more about their customers.  
In the continuance intention model, both self-awareness and immersion were partial 
mediators in the homophily-continuance relationship. However, the direct effect of 
homophily was stronger than the indirect effect, suggesting that manipulating avatar 
similarity might be more fruitful than targeting the mediators to achieve continuance usage. 
Nevertheless, as mediators like immersion, have other attendant benefits, such as enjoyment 
and flow, providing an immersive experience has many advantages. 
Practitioners can target the mediating variables, for instance, making the virtual 
environment more immersive, to motivate players to visit the virtual worlds more often, thus 
developing customer loyalty.  
 
Limitations and future research 
This research provides a better understanding of the effect of self-similar avatars that 
people are inclined to create. By surfacing mechanisms that underlie the relationship between 
avatar similarity and behaviours, and attitudes, like deception, self-disclosure and 
continuance intention, the study clarifies the important role of self-awareness in directing 
psychological processes to bring about these outcomes. However, as with any study, this 
study has a few limitations which also point to directions for future research. 
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Deception is a sensitive topic. Even though lying is an everyday occurrence (DePaulo, 
et al., 1996), individuals may be reluctant to divulge that they lied as it is unfavourably 
viewed as unethical and wrong. An online survey was used in order to mitigate self-
presentation concerns and assurances were made regarding anonymity of the responses. 
However, these may not fully assuage one's desire to see the self as an upright and 
conscientious individual. Future research in this area could explore other ways to alleviate 
deception to obtain truthful responses, for instance, using scenario-based questions which ask 
respondents about their choice of action in a certain situation rather than directly querying 
them about their deceptive behaviours. 
An attempt was made to verify the degree of honesty in the responses received. A 
cross-validation of respondents' reported gender and their profile information revealed that 
most respondents were truthful. Of the 100 randomly-selected respondents, 73% of them had 
real life or second life profile pictures that corresponded to their reported gender or had 
written information that revealed their real life gender. It was not possible to verify the 
gender of the rest of the respondents due to the following reasons: Twelve percent did not 
have any profile pictures or written information to indicate their Second Life gender, 10% 
had made their profiles unsearchable so it was not possible to view their profiles and 5% did 
not fill in their gender in the survey. The cross-validation suggested that respondents were 
generally honest in their responses. 
The self-awareness scale tried to measure respondents’ situational self-awareness 
while using Second Life. Although many respondents completed the survey while they were 
still logged in to the virtual world, some had to complete it at a later time. These respondents 
would then have to retrospectively recall their state of consciousness when in Second Life, 
which could be difficult and therefore problematic. Future studies could try alternative 
methods of engaging survey respondents so as to obtain more accurate information. Having 
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interested parties click on a sandwich board carried by an avatar, for instance, or visit an 
island location to click on a survey giver that could automatically launch the survey might 
increase the number of actual respondents doing the survey whilst they were in-world. As 
respondents are not given a Web address which they can put away till a later time only to be 
forgotten, it might also increase the response rate.  
People from different cultures have different construals of the self (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Since self and culture make each other up (Shweder, 1990), the concept of 
self-awareness may be influenced by culture. Future work can explore the influence of 
cultural differences on self-awareness and determine its effect on behaviour.  
The sample population was made up of Second Life users and this could have 
threatened external validity in terms of generalising the findings to other MMORPGs or 
virtual worlds. However, there is little to suggest that the process through which avatar 
similarity influences behaviour or attitude might be different for other virtual worlds or 
MMORPGs. Having said that, it is important to note that the models or findings may have 
limited applicability for MMORPGs that do not make use of a physically apparent avatar 
since avatar appearance is the driver of homophily in this study. Future studies could validate 
the findings by sampling other virtual environments, as well as first-person shooter games, 
and to explore other drivers of homophily. 
Responses to the deception scale was based solely on respondents' past experience in 
Second Life. It would have been useful to have a measure of respondents' habitual 
presentation of a positive public impression with a scale, such as Paulhus' (1991) Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding. Such a measure would have provided a broader 
perspective on respondents' deceptive behaviour. 
Identifiability was a mediator in the relationship between homophily and self-
disclosure. While the indirect effect was negative, the direct effect was positive. The reverse 
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was the case for the relationship between self-awareness and deception with self-presence as 
a mediator: While the indirect effect was positive, the direct effect was negative. Researchers 
interested in the mediation effect might want to search for a second mediation mechanism for 
these two direct effects that is negative in sign. 
A survey was used to obtain self-reported data in this research, future work could use 
experimental design to validate the findings of this study. Aside from appearance, it would be 
important to examine other factors that affect homophily, such as having a choice of avatars, 
gender similarity or length of time using avatar. Knowing more about the drivers of 
homophily can allow designers more avenues to increase users' homophilous feelings for 
their avatars.  
Further research in the area of avatar effects can push forward a more comprehensive 
understanding of digital representations and virtual environments. This can contribute to 
efforts to improve them and increase user awareness of the impact of their avatars.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Research on virtual representations have seen efforts in unveiling avatar effects in a 
variety of consumer interfaces like online games, virtual worlds, online messaging and online 
forums. As more user interfaces seek to actively involve the user, environments that employ 
digital representations continue to grow. Digital representations vary in their degree of 
likeness to the self. Theoretical frameworks of understanding our digital selves are 
meaningful as choice of our virtual selves is fundamental to being in a virtual environment. 
This study shows that the appearance we choose shapes the way we behave. People change 
their digital selves yet, in turn, they are changed by them. 
It is hoped that future research can further extend this work to build a more 
comprehensive picture of the influence of self-awareness and avatar effects as these can go 
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towards improving the virtual environments that we are increasingly using for much of work 
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Survey items, reliabilities and descriptive statistics 
 
Construct and Measurement Items α M SD 
Appearance Similarity 
To what extent is your avatar in Second Life similar to your real 
self in the following dimensions? 
AS1 Overall  
AS2 Body  
AS3 Weight 
AS4. Overall, would you say that your primary avatar in Second 
Life is:  
- As close to your real self as can be made 
- Generally recognisable as your real self 
- A mix of similar and unrecognisable features to your real self 
- Mostly not recognisable as your real self 
- As far from your real self as can be made 
 
.87 3.05 1.12 
Homophily 
My avatar in Second Life... 
HM1     thinks like me. 
HM2     behaves like me. 
HM3     has thoughts and ideas that are similar to mine. 
HM4     is like me. 
HM5     shares my values. 
HM6     has a lot in common with me. 
HM7     is similar to me. 
 
.87 1.53 .61 
Self-awareness 
When I am using my avatar in Second Life, I am... 
SA1       more conscious of my inner feelings.  
SA2       reflective about my life.  
SA3       aware of my innermost thoughts. 
 
.75 1.82 .80 
Identifiability 
ID1       I am indistinguishable from others in Second Life.* 
ID2       I am unidentifiable from others in Second Life.* 
ID3       I blend in with other people in Second Life.* 
 
.70 3.37 1.04 
Self-presence 
SP1     When something happens to your avatar's body, to what  
extent does it feel like it is happening to any part of your 
body? 
 
While using Second Life, how much did you feel as if... 
SP2     you were moving when your avatar moved (e.g. as in 
flying or dancing)?  
SP3     your avatar were an extension of your body within the 
virtual environment? 
SP4     When something happens to your avatar, to what extent 
does it feel like it is happening to you? 
SP5     While using Second Life, how much did you feel as if you 
were walking when your avatar walked?   
 
.85 3.40 1.02 
Immersion 
IM1    While using Second Life, to what extent did you feel 
surrounded by the virtual environment? 
IM2    While using Second Life, to what extent did you feel like 
.84 2.94 .94 
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you were inside the virtual environment? 
IM3    While using Second Life, to what extent did you feel that 
the virtual environment seemed to be "somewhere I 
visited" rather than "something I saw"? 
IM4    While using Second Life, to what extent were there times 
when the virtual world became the "reality" for you, and 
you almost forgot about the "real world" where you 
physically are? 
IM5    While using Second Life, to what extent did you feel 
immersed in the virtual environment? 
 
Deception 
While speaking to a stranger in Second Life, have you... 
DE1    lied about your occupation? 
DE2    lied about your interests (e.g., hobbies, religious 
orientation, musical preferences)? 
DE3    lied about your real-life marital status? 
DE4    exaggerated or lied about your abilities? 
DE5    misrepresented yourself in any other way? 
 
.86 4.53 .64 
Self-disclosure 
To what extent have you disclosed the following to a stranger in 
Second Life? 
SD1     My personal habits. 
SD2     Things I have done which I feel guilty about. 
SD3     My deepest feelings. 
SD4     What I like and dislike about myself. 
SD5     What is important to me in life. 
SD6     What makes me the person I am. 
SD7      My worst fears. 
SD8      My close relationships with other people. 
 
.91 3.15 .94 
Continuance intention 
CI1       I am likely to continue using Second Life in the next six 
months. 
CI2       I am likely to choose Second Life the next time I visit a 
virtual world. 
CI3       I presently intend to use Second Life regularly. 
 
.84 1.28 .56 
 






















similarity .88         
Homophily .16 .79        
Self-
awareness .06 .38 .79       
Identifiability .04 -.22 -.08 .76      
Self-
presence .02 .13 .34 -.03 .79     
Immersion .02 .13 .34   .80    




disclosure -.01 .06 -.23 .15 .40   .86  
Continuance 
intention .04 .23 .17   .33   .88 
 
Diagonal represents Square Root of Average Variance Extracted 
 
